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An exciting new way to fund social services has recently emerged. This
new financing mechanism, called a social impact bond (SIB), has the potential
to help us tackle some of our nation's most challenging social problems.
Broadly speaking, a SIB is a type of "pay-for-success" contract where private
investors provide the upfront capital to finance a social program, but only
recoup their investment and realize returns ifthe program is successful. Like
any new financing instrument, SIBs create numerous regulatory challenges
that have not yet been addressed. One unresolved issue is the tax implications
of a SIB investment. This Article argues that the current law allows for
multiple possible characterizations of the SIB arrangement for tax purposes.
This uncertainty as to the correct characterization of a SIB investment can
affect a private investor's ultimate tax liability and subject the investor to an
unnecessary audit risk. A SIB investment can also expose a nonprofit investor
to additional taxes or, possibly, even cause it to lose its tax-exempt status.
Despite the potentially substantial tax implications of a SIB investment, no
guidance exists on this issue. This Article is the first to analyze the federal
income tax consequences to investors who participate in a SIB-funded
program. It concludes that SIB arrangements should generally be classified
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as contingent debt instruments under the current tax law but that it may be
appropriate to bifurcate the transaction in the case of nonprofit investors. To
address the substantial tax uncertainty created by the current law, this Article
also argues that Internal Revenue Service guidance is ultimately necessary
and suggests ways to structure the SIB arrangement to minimize the risk of
any negative tax implications until such guidance is issued. Doing so will
hopefully encourage investors to invest in SIBs and thereby unlock an
additional source of capital to fund much needed social services.
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Unemployment, healthcare, education, homelessness, and crime are
among the most pressing problems facing our nation today.' Yet, because of
budget constraints, political pressures, inefficient use of existing resources,
and ineffective programs, we are not likely to solve, or even adequately
address, these social problems anytimne soon. The good news is a new way to
fund social services has emerged, which may help improve social outcomes
and tackle these issues. This innovative financing mechanism is called a social
impact bond (SEB), and it has recently gained popularity both in the United
States and abroad.'
Broadly speaking, a SIB is a type of "pay-for-success" contract.' It is
an arrangement where private investors provide the upfront capital to finance
1 . See Sir Ronald Cohen & Matt Bannick, Is Social Impact the Next
Venture Capital?, FORBES (Sep. 20, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspinI20 14/09/20/is-social-impact-investing-the-next-venture-capital/#34052 1 c32
b90; Lydia Saad, Cluster of Concerns Vie for Top US. Problem in 2014,
GALLUP (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 80398/cluster-concemns-vie-top
-problem-2014.aspx (describing the top issues that Americans view as the country's
most important problems in 2014).
2. See Ron Davies, Social Impact Bonds: Private Finance That Generates
Social Returns, BRIEFING (Eur. Parliamentary Research Serv.), Aug. 28, 2014,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/538223-Social-impact-bonds-FINAL.pdf
(noting that SIB-financed programs have been launched in the United States,
Australia, and the United Kingdom and are beginning to be created in other European
countries, including the Netherlands, France, and Germany).
3. Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs with
Social Impact Bonds, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 964 (2012); John Hartley,
Social Impact Bonds Are Going Mainstream, FORBES (Sep. 15, 2014, 1:59 PM),
http://www.forbes.cont/sites/Jonhartley/20 14/09/15/social-impact-bonds-are-going-
mainstream/# 1 7ad4092l17d5; Ashley Pettus, Pay for Progress: Social Impact Bonds,
HARV. MAG., Jul.-Aug. 2013, at 12, http://harvardmagazine.comI20 13/07/social-
impact-bonds. Although the terms "SIB" and "pay-for-success" bond or contract are
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a social program but only recoup their investment and realize returns if the
program is successful. 4 Unlike the traditional method of funding social
services with government funds, a SIB uses private sector funds to provide the
initial capital to finance social programs.' The government is only liable for
repaying these investors if the social program is successful in achieving
predetermined social outcomes, which generally also have the added
advantage of producing public sector savings and benefits.' But if the program
does not achieve the agreed-upon policy goals, the government retains its
funds and the investor loses its capital.'
Like any new financing instrument, SIBs create numerous regulatory
challenges that have not yet been addressed. 8 One such challenge is
determining how SIBs are taxed. Currently, the federal income tax
consequences to investors who participate in a SIB-funded program are
unclear, and no guidance or scholarly discussion exists on this issue.9
often used interchangeably, they are not always synonyms. JITINDER KOHLI ET AL.,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: AN INNOVATIVE NEW
FINANCING TOOL FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2 (2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/social impact bonds brief.pdf. A SIB is a
type of pay-for-success contract because the investors' returns are tied solely to
successful outcomes. Id. at 2. However, a pay-for-success contract is not necessarily
a SIB because a pay-for-success contract does not always involve outside investors. It
instead may be a performance-based agreement directly between the government and
the service provider. See id. Moreover, only a portion of the government payments
may be tied to accomplishing successful outcomes rather than the entire amount of
government funds, such as in the case of traditional performance contracting where
bonus payments are available to service providers that meet certain performance
benchmarks. Id.
4. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1; Soc. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, AN
OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2012), http://social
impactarchitects.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Overview-of-Social-Impact-
Bonds-1 1 122.pdf.
5. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
6. See Cox, supra note 3, at 961; Pay for Success Financing, 9
COMMUNITY DEV. INv. REv., no.1, 2013 (issue containing various articles regarding
pay-for-success transactions, including SIBs); Soc. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra
note 4.
7. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
8. SIBs also raise numerous policy issues that are beyond the scope of this
Article. The focus of this Article is primarily on the tax treatment of SIBs. For a
discussion of various tax policy issues, including whether favorable tax treatment
should be extended to SIBs, see Orly Mazur, Social Impact Bonds: A Tax-Favored
Investment? (Mar. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
9. Because these instruments are just now emerging, substantial
scholarship has not yet been generated discussing the many issues that SIBs raise. To
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This Article fills the gap in the literature by examining the tax
consequences that result from investing in SIBs. It does so by
comprehensively analyzing how investments in SIBs are potentially taxed
under the current law from a doctrinal perspective and discussing the tax
uncertainties that SIB investments raise. Specifically, it argues that although
the tax consequences to private investors who participate in a SIB-funded
program significantly depend on the characterization of the transaction for tax
law purposes, the current law allows for multiple possible tax characterizations
of the SIB arrangement. Plausible characterizations of a SIB arrangement
include a debt instrument, a corporate equity instrument, a joint venture, and
a derivative instrument. These various characterizations will result in key tax
differences that could significantly impact the private investor's bottom-line
profits and may result in similarly situated taxpayers being taxed differently.
A SIB investment also creates potential conflicts with the private inurement
doctrine, the private benefit doctrine, and the various excise taxes applicable
to private foundations, which means that a SIB investment could also expose
a nonprofit investor to additional taxes or, possibly, even cause it to lose its
tax-exempt status.
As SIBs continue to grow in popularity, there is a pressing need to
resolve this issue to prevent the tax law from discouraging investments in SIBs
and to ensure that the appropriate amount of tax revenue is collected from SIB
investments. Thus, given the potential importance of SIBs to the public sector
and the social policy goals that they fund, the Internal Revenue Service
date, the scholarship has primarily focused on issues relating to the implications for
nonprofits' involvement in SIBs, securities laws issues, the potential implications of
SIBs, and the potential pitfalls. See, e.g., Peter G. Dagher, Jr., Note, Social Impact
Bonds and the Private Benefit Doctrine: Will Participation Jeopardize a Nonprofit's
Tax-Exempt Status?, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 3479 (2013) (examining SIBs from the
perspective of a nonprofit organization and answering the question of whether the
profit margin that the private investors may achieve would qualify as an impermissible
private benefit that would allow the Service to revoke a participating nonprofit's tax-
exempt status); Kevin W. Humphries, Comment, Not Your Older Brother 's Bonds:
The Use and Regulation of Social-Impact Bonds in the United States, 76 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 433 (2014) (discussing the likely characterization of SIBs for
purposes of securities law and arguing that SIBs may require the issuance of new
regulations to ensure the optimization of public SIB investment and reduce the
likelihood of fraud in the offering of SIBs and the implementation of SIB-financed
projects).
In addition, no publicly available tax opinions exist with respect to any of the
currently launched SIB projects. Thus, it is also unclear how practitioners are
approaching this issue. The author's discussion with various parties involved in SIB
projects launched in the United States also reaffirms that a lot of uncertainty exists in
determining the income tax implications of a SIB investment.
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(Service) should issue a Notice or Revenue Ruling that confirms the tax results
for SIBs. Until such guidance is issued, this Article argues that, although these
instruments contain features that are indicative of debt, equity, and charity,
SIBs should generally be classified as contingent debt instruments under the
current tax law and that it may be appropriate to bifurcate the transaction in
the case of nonprofit investors. The Article also suggests methods to structure
the SIB arrangement to minimize some of the negative tax implications that a
SIB investment potentially raises for investors.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the traditional SIB
model. It discusses some possible modifications to the traditional model and
provides an example of a SIB-financed project that has been launched in the
United States to illustrate the tax issues that a SIB investment raises. Part II
applies the traditional debt-equity analysis to argue that the current law allows
for multiple possible characterizations of the SIB arrangement for tax
purposes. Parts III and IV analyze the federal income tax consequences to
private investors and nonprofit investors, respectively, who invest in
SIBs under the traditional SIB model. 1o Finally, Part V concludes with
recommendations as to the most appropriate tax treatment under the current
law and tax planning suggestions. By doing so, this Article seeks to minimize
the substantial tax uncertainty that SIB investors face and thereby encourage
participation in this innovative financing mechanism. With this additional
source of capital, SIB-financed programs can potentially make a meaningful
impact on some of our nation's most challenging social problems.
I. WHAT IS A SOCIAL IMPACT BOND?
Although SIBs may be structured in various ways, the majority of the
SIBs launched in the United States have a similar structure. " This Part
describes the currently prevailing SIB model, as well as some common
10. This Article discusses the relevant tax considerations related to SIBs in
an attempt to add to the scholarly discussion in this area. However, investors are
encouraged to seek advice about their specific tax consequences from their tax advisor.
11. See, e.g., John Olson & Andrea Phillips, Rikers Island: The First Social
Impact Bond in the United States, 9 COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REv., no.1, 2013, at 97, 99
(describing the SIB launched in New York City that utilized MDRC, an intermediary,
to oversee the project implementation and manage the service providers); FACT
SHEET: THE MASSACHUSETTS JUVENILE JUSTICE PAY FOR SUCCESS INITIATIVE,
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/trends-in-our-business/massachusetts-
social-impact-bond/MA-juvenile-justice-pay-for-success-initiative.pdf (last visited
Apr. 29, 2017) [hereinafter MASS. FACT SHEET] (providing that Third Sector Capital
Partners, an intermediary, will effectively serve as the prime contractor for the SIB
launched in Massachusetts).
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modifications to the model. It then discusses a SIB that has been launched in
the United States to illustrate the tranche investment structure that is often used
in practice and to highlight the tax issues that these new instruments raise.
A. The Traditional SIB Model
Under the most common SIB model, a government agency enters into
a contractual agreement with an intermediary organization to implement a
SIB-funded program to address a particular social problem. 12 For instance, a
government entity might decide it wants to reduce recidivism at a certain
prison or jail or it wants to reduce homelessness in a particular area. Its
contractual agreement with the intermediary would specify the objectives of
this program, the specific target populations, the method and amount of
funding, the duration of the SIB-funded program, and the terms of the
investment. 13 Importantly, the agreement would also specify that the
government is to transfer funds to the intermediary if the program is successful
and would identify the performance thresholds, method of performance
evaluation, and the payment schedule, among other key payment terms.14
12. See Cox, supra note 3, at 965; Soc. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 4.
Generally, the government agency initiates a SIB by selecting the social issue that it
wants to address with SIB financing. See EMIuE GOODALL, BRIDGES IMPACT+,
CHOOSING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 13 (2014), https://data
.gov.uk/sib knowledge box/sites/default/files/Bridges%20SIB%20Report%20-%20
a%20Practitioner's%20Guide.pdf. However, it is also possible for an intermediary
organization or a service provider to reach out to the relevant government agency
about addressing a particular social problem through a SIB-funded program. The
government agency would then decide whether to launch a SIB to address this social
problem. See id.
13. See e.g., Pay for Success Contract Among the Commonwealth of Mass.,
ROCA, Inc., and Youth Servs. Inc. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/final-pay-for-success-contract-executed-1-7-2013.pdf
[hereinafter Mass. Contract] (defining the terms of the SIB launched in Massachusetts
to targetjuvenile rescidivism); Pay for Success Intermediary Agreement between N.Y.
State Dep't. of Labor, Soc. Fin., Inc., & Soc. Fin. N.Y. State Workforce Re-Entry 2013
Manager, Inc. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resour
ce-files/pfsmainagreementsched_0314.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. Agreement] (defining
the terms of the SIB contract between N.Y. State Department of Labor and the
intermediary to improve social outcomes).
14. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3. The contractual agreement specifies
how the government will fund the payments if the program is successful. In some
cases, the federal government or a philanthropic organization may finance a portion
of these costs. See, e.g., MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11 (describing that any success
payments will be paid by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's Social Innovation
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The intermediary, typically a nonprofit organization, often serves in a
dual role of fiscal agent and project manager. s As fiscal agent, the
intermediary raises capital from investors to fund the social services.16 It does
so by selling to private investors and philanthropic organizations an instrument
whose repayment is contingent upon the success of a particular social
program.17 The investors thereby provide the upfront financing for the social
program and assume the financial risk if the targeted social outcomes are not
met by the service provider(s)."
The intermediary, in its role as project manager, essentially also serves
as the prime contractor for the project. It is generally responsible for selecting
the qualified service provider(s), typically nonprofit agencies," to deliver the
Trust Fund and supplemented by a U.S. Department of Labor pay-for-success grant);
INVESTING IN WHAT WORKS: "PAY FOR SUCCESS" IN NEW YORK STATE: INCREASING
EMPLOYMENT AND IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY: FACT SHEET (2014), http://social
finance.org/content/uploads/PFSFactSheet_0314.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. FACT SHEET]
(stating that if the program is successful a portion of the funds paid to the intermediary
will be financed by a grant awarded to New York State by the U.S. Department of
Labor). The government generally is also responsible for paying administrative costs,
such as the intermediary's service fees, regardless of whether the program is
successful. See ADRIANA BARAJAS ET AL, PRINCETON UNIV. PUB. POLICY & INT'L
AFFAIRS PROGRAM, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A NEW TOOL FOR SOCIAL FINANCING
(2014), https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/Social%20lmpact%20B
onds%202014%2OFinal%20Report.pdf.
15. See Cox, supra note 3, at 966; Pettus, supra note 3; see also, e.g., MASS.
FACT SHEET, supra note 11 (describing the intermediary's role as fiscal agent and
project manager); GOODALL, supra note 12, at 39 (describing the intermediary's role
as working with the government to structure the SIB, selecting the service providers,
and providing ongoing performance management services).
16. See BARAJAS ET AL., supra note 14, at 13.
17. See Cox, supra note 3, at 966.
18. See Soc. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 4; Nonprofit Finance Fund,
Basics, PAY FOR SUCCESS, http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn/basics/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2017).
19. The SIBs currently implemented in the United States generally have
utilized nonprofit entities as the service providers. See, e.g., INVESTING IN WHAT
WORKS: "PAY FOR SUCCESS" IN NEW YORK STATE: INCREASING EMPLOYMENT AND
IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY: DETAILED PROJECT SUMMARY 16 (2014), http://doc
player.net/8280615-Investing-in-what-works-pay-for-success-in-new-york-state-
increasing-employment-and-improving-public-safety.html [hereinafter N.Y. PROJECT
SUMMARY] (identifying the service provider as Center for Employment Opportunities,
a nonprofit employment service agency for formerly incarcerated individuals); FACT
SHEET: THE CUYAHOGA PARTNERING FOR FAMILY SUCCESS PROGRAM, http://www.
thirdsectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/141204 Cuyahoga PFS Fact-Sheet
.pdf [hereinafter CUYAHOGA FACT SHEET] (identifying FrontLine Service, a nonprofit
438 [Vol 20:7
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SIB-financed social services to the target population. In this role, the
intermediary also coordinates the multiple SIB stakeholders and oversees the
operation of the SIB-funded program.2 0
Finally, after a fixed period of time, an independent evaluator
measures the success of the program according to a predetermined rigorous
evaluation methodology. 2 If the evaluator determines that the social service
provider is successful in achieving the agreed-upon outcomes, then the
government repays the investors their original capital plus a return on their
investment.22 The financial return often depends on the extent to which social
outcomes improve and on the expected public sector savings. 23 However, if
the program is unsuccessful, then the government pays the investors nothing
and the investors lose their entire investment.24
The following diagram illustrates the structure of the currently
prevailing SIB model in the United States.25
entity, to provide services to address homelessness). However, this role can
technically also be performed by for-profit entities.
20. See Nonprofit Finance Fund, supra note 18.
21. See BARAJAS ET AL., supra note 14, at 14; Nonprofit Finance Fund,
supra note 18. The evaluator is generally selected by the government and intermediary
together but paid for directly by the government. See BARAJAS ET AL., supra note 14,
at 14. In addition to an evaluator, an independent third party generally validates that
the evaluator accurately measured the results of the program. See Sarah Gillespie, 6
Ways to Strengthen PFS Evaluations, URB. INST., http://pfs.urban.org/pay-success/
pfs-perspectives/6-ways-strengthen-pfs-evaluations (last visited Apr. 29, 2017).
22. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2; Davies, supra note 2, at 3.
23. See LISA BARCLAY & TOM SYMoNs, Soc. FIN., A TECHNICAL GUIDE
To DEVELOPING SOCIAL IMPACT BoNDs (2013), http://www.socialfmance.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Technical-Guide-to-Developing-Social-Impact-Bonds1.pdf;
Soc. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 4.
24. See KoHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 3.
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The managed SIB structure, which is the SIB model described above,
is currently the prevailing model in the United States, but it is not the only way
to structure a SIB. Even though SIBs share some common attributes, they are
not all identical. Moreover, additional variations are likely to result as the SIB
model continues to evolve.
For instance, other emerging SIB structures worldwide include the
direct SIB structure and the intermediated SIB structure.26 Both variations
eliminate or minimize the use of a project intermediary.2 7 In the direct SIB
structure the government enters into a contract directly with the service
provider instead of through an intermediary organization.28 Similarly, in the
intermediated SIB structure, the arrangement also generally forgoes the use of
an intermediary because the government enters into a contract directly with
investors through an investor-owned special purpose vehicle that is set up
specifically to deliver the SIB program.29 This type of SIB is often structured
as an equity investment in a social impact entity.
Another common variation to the SIB model is a SIB arrangement that
uses two separate intermediaries instead of one organization that performs the
dual role of fiscal agent and project manager.30 Under this variation, one
26. See GOODALL, supra note 12, at 20.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See BARCLAY & SYMONS, supra note 23; GOODALL, supra note 12, at 20.
30. See Nonprofit Finance Fund, supra note 18.
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entity, such as an investment bank, placement agent, or other type of financial
intermediary, would serve as the fiscal agent and raise the capital to finance
the SIB project. A separate entity would act as the project manager that
oversees the service providers and manages the different SIB stakeholders. It
is possible for a for-profit organization, such as a professional management
company, to undertake this role instead of using the traditional nonprofit entity
as the project intermediary.31
In addition, a SIB structure may deviate from the traditional SIB
model outlined above by including various risk mitigating provisions. One
common risk-mitigation provision is a guarantee that limits the investors'
downside exposure. For instance, the SIB launched in New York State in 2013
included a first loss guarantee facility provided by a third party that limited an
investor's potential loss from an unsuccessful program to 90% instead of
100% of its initial investment.3 2 Similarly, the SIB launched in New York City
in 2012 also included a guarantee, which served to significantly limit an
investor's exposure to only a 25% loss of investment. 3 3 Other possible risk-
mitigating provisions include the provision of collateral in an adequately
valued asset, an interest in reserve funds, first-loss provisions, and other credit-
enhancing methods.
C Massachusetts SIB: The Tranche Loan Structure
As of February 2016, 11 SIB-funded projects have been announced in
the United States with many more anticipated to launch in the near future.34
31. See Cox, supra note 3, at 966-67; THIRD SECTOR CAPITAL PARTNERS,
PAY FOR SUCCESS/SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: RFI 5 (June 10, 2011), http://www.third
sectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Third-Sector-RFl response.pdf.
32. See N.Y. PROJECT SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 5, 17. However, the
terms of the guarantee provided that the first loss protection did not apply to all
investors but only to non-national or regional foundation investors. See id at 5.
33. See Olson & Phillips, supra note 11, at 99.
34. Olson & Phillips, supra note 11, at 97; see CONNECTICUT FAMILY
STABILITY PAY FOR SUCCESS PROJECT: FACT SHEET, http://www.ct.gov/
dcflib/dcf/socialimpactbonds/pdf/ct familystabilityjpfs factsheetvfinal(2).pdf;
CUYAHOGA FACT SHEET, supra note 19; FACT SHEET: DENVER SOCIAL IMPACT BOND
PROGRAM TO ADDRESS HOMELESSNESS, http://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/12/Denver-SIB-FactSheet.pdf; MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; N.Y. FACT
SHEET, supra note 14; FACT SHEET: PROJECT WELCOME HOME, http://www.third
sectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/150811_SCC-CH-PFSFact-Sheet.pdf
(Santa Clara County, California); FACT SHEET: SOUTH CAROLINA NURSE-FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP PAY FOR SUCCESS PROJECT, https://www.scdhhs.gov/sites/default/files
/2-16-16-SC-NFP-PFS-Fact-Sheet_3.pdf; FACT SHEET: THE UTAH HIGH QUALITY
PRESCHOOL PROGRAM: AMERICA'S FIRST "RESULTS-BASED FINANCING" FOR EARLY
2017] 441
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The majority of the SIBs currently launched in the United States have been
structured as loans from investors to the project's intermediary organization,
which then disburses the funds to the service provider(s). The SIB-funded
program that was recently launched in Massachusetts (the Massachusetts SIB)
was structured in this manner.3 5 More specifically, the Massachusetts SIB
used a tranche loan structure. The following section describes its key
investment terms.
The Massachusetts SIB was launched in order to reduce recidivism
and improve employment outcomes for former juvenile inmates.36 To finance
the project, investorS 37 commit to transfer approximately $18 million to the
intermediary, referred to as the "borrower," in the form of loans and/or grants,
which the intermediary will periodically disperse to the service provider for a
period of approximately six years.3 ' These investors include Goldman Sachs
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, https://hceconomics.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/ev
ents/Salt%20Lake%2OCity%20PFS%2OFact%20Sheet%20%20%28FINAL%2010-
28-13%29.pdf [hereinafter UTAH PRESCHOOL FACT SHEET]; see also CONNECTICUT
FAMILY STABILITY PAY FOR SUCCESS PROJECT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:,
http://www.ct.gov/dcf/lib/dcf/socialimpactbonds/pdf/ct-family-stability-pfs faq
vfinal.pdf; Press Release, Mayor's Press Office, City of Chi., Mayor Emanuel
Announces Expansion of Pre-K to More Than 2,600 Chi. Public School Child. (Oct.
7, 2014), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press room/press
releases/2014/oct/mayor-emanuel-announces-expansion-of-pre-k-to-more-than-2-
600-ch.html; Press Release, Office of the Governor, Massachusetts Launches Pay for
Success Initiative to Reduce Chronic Individual Homelessness, (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstreamI/handle/2452/217588/ocn795183245-2014-
12-08b.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
35. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts launched its Juvenile Justice SIB
in 2014 in partnership with Youth Services Inc. as the intermediary, Roca Inc. as the
service provider, and several private investors. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at
1. Youth Services Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation created by Third Sector Capital
Partners, Inc. to serve as its supporting organization for this specific project. See
MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at 1, 9, 32, H-1.
Third Sector Capital Partners will assist Youth Services Inc. by providing project
management and advisory services. Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at H-2. New Profit
Inc., a national venture philanthropy fund and social innovation organization, is
working with the intermediary to provide additional fiscal support for the project.
MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
36. See MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13,
at 1.
37. The project documents collectively refer to the investors as "funders"
or the "funding parties." See MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra
note 13.
38. See MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13,
at A-2, A-3, app. H. Specifically, the funds will be used by the intermediary to pay the
442 [Vol 20:7
Taxing Social Impact Bonds
(the Senior Lender), which is providing up to nine million in senior loan
financing, subject to a five percent annual stated interest rate. 39 An additional
three million in financing will come from two philanthropic foundations (the
Junior Lenders) in the form of multiple-draw subordinate loans, bearing a two
percent annual stated interest rate.40 Six million dollars in financing will come
in the form of philanthropic grants from the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation, New Profit, and The Boston Foundation. 41 Moreover, the
intermediary and service provider are also contributing to the project in the
form of deferred service fees. Specifically, each has agreed to defer a portion
of its service fees so that they are only paid if the performance thresholds are
met.42
The Senior Lender and Junior Lenders (collectively, the lenders) have
agreed to bear the majority of the financial risk associated with the program
implementation.43 According to the project documents, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts will only make payments to the intermediary, which will then
be disbursed to the investors, if the project is determined to be successful based
on predetermined performance metrics.4 4 If the project satisfies the agreed-
service provider agreed-upon fees related to the project. Mass. Contract, supra note
13, at app. H.
39. MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at
H-2. Goldman Sachs is providing the funds through its wholly owned entity, Goldman
Sachs Social Impact Fund, L.P. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at H-2. The
investment is structured as a multiple draw social impact loan. See id.
The duration of the investment is 25 quarters, or six years and three months.
Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H. However, the duration of the loan may be
less if an event of default occurs or if the lenders exercise their option to discontinue
the funding. See id.
40. MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at H-2.
41. MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at H-2.
42. MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H.
43. By deferring the receipt of their service fees, the intermediary and
service provider have also taken on some of the financial risk associated with the
project. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. D.
44. See MASs. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13,
at 12 ("All of the Commonwealth Success Payments made under this Contract are
contingent on the achievement of specific outcomes related to reductions in
incarceration and improved job readiness and employment outcomes for the Roca
Youth. . . ."). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will partially fund these success
payments from the proceeds of a grant awarded to the Commonwealth from the U.S.
Department of Labor and partially from the Commonwealth's Social Innovation
Financing Trust Fund. MASs. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note
13, at 12-13. The Social Innovation Financing Trust Fund was created by the
Massachusetts Legislature to provide the Commonwealth with funds with which to
4432017]
upon minimum performance thresholds, then the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts will make a predetermined payment to the intermediary. 45 To
the extent that these performance metrics are exceeded, the government will
make additional payments calculated on a sliding scale on the basis of the
expected government budgetary savings from reducing incarceration and
increasing employment. 46 To partially mitigate the investors' risk of
repayment, the project documents also provide the lenders a lien and security
interest on payments the intermediary receives and has a right to receive from
the government. 47
enter into pay-for-success contracts. See MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass.
Contract, supra note 13, at 1, 12-13. These funds are backed by the full faith and credit
of the Commonwealth. Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at 12.
45. According to the contractual agreement, before any payments will be
made by the government and transferred to the lenders, certain performance metrics
must be met. Specifically, the agreement requires: (1) at least a 5.2% reduction in the
days of incarceration of the target population or (2) an increase in employment by a
program participant as compared to the control group. MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note
11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at 13-27. In addition, the government makes
payments to the intermediary when a third performance metric is met: an increase in
job readiness. This metric is considered achieved when a project participant engages
with a Roca youth worker nine or more times. Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at 43,
A-1. However, any success payments made by the Commonwealth on the basis of this
performance metric will be deposited by the intermediary into a separate account and
used exclusively by the intermediary to pay the service provider its fees. Id. at D-1,
app. H. Any remaining funds will be available to pay to the lenders any amounts due
to them only at the termination of the contract (the 25th quarter, unless terminated
earlier). Id. at D-1, app. H. Moreover, although the success payments are technically
based on these three performance metrics: reduction in days of incarceration, increases
in job readiness, and increases in employment, the majority of the success payments
depend on the extent the recidivism outcome metric is satisfied. MASS. FACT SHEET,
supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13.
46. MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
47. Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. D, H-4. Specifically, the project
documents provide that the intermediary will direct the government to deposit the
success payments related to the incarceration outcome metric and employment
outcome metric into a separate controlled account. Id. The Senior Lender will have a
first priority lien and security interest in this controlled account and in the
intermediary's right to receive these success payments under the terms of the pay-for-
success contract with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. The Junior Lenders
will have a second priority lien and security interest in this account. The purpose of
these liens and security interest is to secure the intermediary's obligations to the
lenders under the contract. Id. The intermediary will have the right to withdraw
amounts from this account to be paid to the investors and other parties according to
the contract terms; provided, however, if an event of default occurs then the Senior
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The intermediary will disburse these payments to the investors as
follows: on the last business day of each quarter, to the extent of available
funds, the intermediary will first pay the Senior Lender any interest that has
accrued on the senior loan and then pay the Junior Lenders any interest that
has accrued on the junior loan.48 Then in the last few quarters of the project,
the intermediary will use its available funds to first pay the Senior Lender any
additional interest that is due and then to pay interest due to the Junior
Lenders.49 Any remaining funds will first be used to repay the Senior Lender
its principal funding.o If sufficient success payments remain after repaying
the senior loan in full, the Junior Lenders will recoup their investment.
According to the project terms, the Senior Lender and the Junior Lenders will
only recoup their entire capital investment if the third-party evaluator
determines that the project has resulted in a 40% decrease in the days that the
target population is incarcerated.52 Moreover, in the event that the program
exceeds this performance threshold, the investors will also receive an
additional return on their investment in the form of success fees from the
government.53 Specifically, depending on the level of the program's success,
the Senior Lender will receive up to approximately one million in success fees
and the Junior Lenders collectively will receive up to approximately $600,000
in success fees.54
Lender will have the authority to cause 100% of the amounts in these accounts to be
paid to the parties in the order and priority described in the contract. Id.
48. Id. at app. H.
49. Id. Specifically, these additional payments will be made in quarters 18,
19, 21, and 23 of the project. Id. The intermediary will not transfer any success
payments related to increases in job readiness to the parties. These funds, to the extent
remaining, will only be transferred upon the maturity date (i.e., the 25th project
quarter). Id.
50. Id.
51. MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
52. Id. The service provider and intermediary will also receive their
deferred service fees if at least this level of success is reached. Id.
53. Id. However, the intermediary will pay the service provider and Third
Sector Capital Partners their deferred service fees before the lenders are entitled to
payment of any success fees. Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H. These payments
will be made in quarters 18, 19, 21, and 23, if total success payments made by the
government exceed $14,750,000 and in quarter 25 if total success payments exceed
$14,615,000. Id. at app. D, H-12.
54. MAsS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13. In
addition to the payments made to the lenders, if the project exceeds its target impact
and enough funds are available, the service provider will also be paid up to $1 million.
Any remaining success payments will be used to recycle philanthropic funding to
support future pay-for-success initiatives and to support the scaling of the project's
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H. CHARACTERIZATION OF SIBS
Like any new financing instrument, SIBs create numerous regulatory
challenges that have not yet been addressed. One such challenge is
determining how the current law taxes SIBs. Although the tax consequences
to private investors who participate in a SIB-funded program significantly
depend on the characterization of the transaction for tax law purposes, the
character of these instruments is not clear under current tax law. Below, I
analyze the threshold question of whether SIBs are debt for tax law purposes,
and then, having found that the answer is uncertain, I explore alternate possible
characterizations under current tax law.
A. Are SIBs Debt?
The determination of whether a financial instrument is debt, equity, or
something else for U.S. federal income tax purposes is not always an easy
determination to make." This is especially true in the context of SIBs. Even
service provider. Id. at app. D, H-16; see also FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: THE
MASSACHUSETTS JUVENILE JUSTICE PAY FOR SUCCESS INITIATIVE (2014),
http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MA-JJ-PFS-Frequently-
Asked-Questions-Revised-Final.pdf. The total success payments made to all of the
parties are capped at $28 million, thus limiting the funders' potential return on
investment. MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at 12.
55. There is no bright line rule that distinguishes between debt and equity
under our tax law, and financial instruments frequently contain a hybrid of debt and
equity features. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968);
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 113TH CONG., JCS-3-13, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON PRESENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
REFORM SUBMITTED TO THE TAX REFORM WORKING GROUPS 58 (2013); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 112TH CONG., JCX-41-11, PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS DEBT (2011) [hereinafter
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, BUSINESS DEBT]; Michael S. Farber, Equity, Debt, Not-The
Tax Treatment of Non-Debt Open Transactions, 60 TAX LAW. 635, 636 (2007);
Edward D. Kleinbard & Erika W. Nijenhuis, Everything IKnow About New Financial
Products ILearnedfrom DECS, in 26 PLI CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES ch. 392
(2010); Bret Wells, Tax Consequences of Participations in International Trade
Finance, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 23 (Dec. 2, 1996). Moreover, despite a specific
statutory mandate, the Treasury has not yet issued regulations offering general
guidance in distinguishing between equity and debt, although it has recently issued
regulations requiring documentation for and recharacterization of certain financing
arrangements entered into by large, multi-national enterprises. I.R.C. § 385(a); Reg.
§§ 1.385-1 to -4T. To further complicate matters, the Service also will ordinarily not
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though the capital-raising arrangement between investors and the intermediary
in a SIB-funded program is referred to as a "bond," this label is not dispositive.
Instead, to properly characterize for tax purposes the arrangement between the
investors and the project intermediary requires an analysis of all of the facts
and circumstances related to the arrangement. 6
In distinguishing debt from equity, factors that are generally
considered include: " (1) the parties' intent, (2) the existence of an
unconditional promise to pay at a fixed maturity date, (3) the provision of fixed
interest rates, (4) participation in profits, (5) the adequacy of the interest, (6)
the source of payments, (7) participation in management, (8) the extent of
subordination to the claims of general creditors, (9) the identity of interest
between holders of the instrument and owners, (10) satisfaction of the
independent creditor test, and (11) the use of the funds." The goal of this
analysis is to determine whether the instrument represents "risk capital entirely
subject to the fortunes of the venture," which would be characterized as equity
or, alternatively, whether the instrument represents "an unqualified promise to
pay a sum certain on a specified date with fixed interest," which would be
characterized as debt for tax purposes. 59
The SIB financing transactions launched thus far contain features of
both debt and equity. The following analysis describes the factors above and
applies each of the factors to the Massachusetts SIB to determine whether SIBs
may be characterized as debt under current tax law.
issue advance rulings with respect to whether an interest should be classified as debt
or equity. Rev. Proc. 2017-3, at § 4.02(1), 2017-1 I.R.B. 130.
56. See Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 695 (applying a facts and circumstances
analysis to determine whether the investment represents debt or equity for tax
purposes); JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, BusINEss DEBT, supra note 55, at 15 (noting that
"[c]ourts generally agree that the proper characterization of an instrument requires a
facts and circumstances analysis . . . ."); Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (listing
factors that may be considered in characterizing a financial instrument for federal
income tax purposes).
57. The foregoing list contains a nonexhaustive list of factors that courts
generally consider. Different courts may apply a slightly different list of factors to
distinguish debt from equity. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, BUSINESs DEBT, supra note
55, at 16.
58. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385(b) (listing possible factors to be set forth in
regulations); Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986) (using an
11-factor test); Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972)
(applying a 13-factor test); Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 696 (applying a 16-factor test);
Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (outlining eight factors that the Service may consider
in classifying an instrument as debt or equity).
59. JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, BusINEss DEBT, supra note 55, at 15.
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1. The Parties'Intent
In the case of the Massachusetts SIB, the parties' intentions and the
form of the instrument initially points toward debt characterization.6 0 The
investment is referred to as a loan from the investors to the project
intermediary, and the investors are referred to as "lenders."" Moreover, if the
intermediary were to issue notes or another instrument of indebtedness, this
would strengthen the weight of this factor in favor of debt classification.62
Conversely, an absence of notes or other instruments of indebtedness is a
strong indication that the instrument is not bona fide indebtedness.63 It is
unclear from publicly available documents whether any instrument of
indebtedness was issued to the investors of the Massachusetts SIB.
60. The subjective intent of the parties will not change the characterization
of an instrument, but the objective facts surrounding an advance will be considered in
determining whether the parties intended the advance to constitute debt or equity. See
In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d
at 407).
61. Although the agreement between the investors and the project
intermediary is not publicly available, the Pay for Success Contract among the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the service provider, and the project intermediary
provides some evidence of the manner in which the agreement between the project
intermediary and the investors is structured. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app.
H (providing an overview of the terms of financing related to the project).
The intent of the parties regarding the treatment of the instrument for nontax
purposes, such as regulatory, ratings agency or financial accounting purposes, is
sometimes also considered in characterizing the instrument. See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube,
800 F.2d at 631 (applying an I1-factor test, that does not include consideration of the
nontax treatment of the instrument, to characterize the transaction in question); Notice
94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (indicating the Service considers this factor in distinguishing
debt from equity); Paul Carman & Kelley Bender, Equity or Other: Applying a Binary
Analysis in a Multidimensional World, 107 J. TAX'N 17 (2007) (explaining that this
factor is controversial). There is no public information available that indicates how the
project intermediary treats the SIB for nontax purposes, but it appears that it is most
likely not treated as debt for purposes of the securities laws. See Humphries, supra
note 9.
62. See Roth Steel Tube, 800 F.2d at 625; Estate ofMixon, 464 F.2d at 403.
However, the issuance of notes or bonds would not guarantee debt treatment if the
other factors are sufficiently adverse so as to indicate the substance of the instrument
is equity. See Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 697-98; William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26
TAX L. REv. 369, 461 (1970).
63. See Roth Steel Tube, 800 F.2d at 625; Estate ofMixon, 464 F.2d at 403.
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2. Existence ofan Unconditional Promise to Repay at a Fixed Maturity
Date
An important consideration in the debt-equity analysis is the existence
of an unconditional promise to repay a sum certain at a fixed maturity date. 64
In the Massachusetts SIB, the investment has a set term of approximately six
years.6 ' Generally, the presence of a fixed maturity date to repay principal that
is in the reasonably foreseeable future is indicative of debt.66 However, in the
Massachusetts SIB, the intermediary does not unconditionally promise to
repay the investors. Instead, the repayment of principal is contingent on the
project satisfying predetermined performance metrics, at which point the
government makes payments to the intermediary, which are later disbursed to
the investors. 67 Thus, it is unclear whether this requirement is met.
Moreover, even advances with a maturity date can be characterized as
equity when they will not be paid by the due date but instead only when
sufficient funds are available, as is the case with the Massachusetts SIB.6 ' The
case law also indicates that the existence of a sinking fund to provide for the
ultimate repayment of the purported debt or the existence of a security interest
in the issuer's funds may suggest that repayment is reasonable and thus debt
was intended, unless security is grossly inadequate. 69 In the Massachusetts
SIB, the project documents provide the investors with a security interest in the
success payments that the intermediary receives and has a right to receive. But
the amount of these payments may be considered inadequate given that the
right to these payments is speculative and dependent on the success of the SIB-
64. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220,
235 (2d Cir. 2006); Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th
Cir. 1984); Estate ofMixon, 464 F.2d at 404; Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; Plumb,
supra note 62, at 413.
65. Technically, the maturity date is 25 project quarters. Mass. Contract,
supra note 13, at app. H. However, depending on the availability of funds, some or all
of the principal may be repaid prior to this date in quarters 18, 19, 21, and 23. Mass.
Contract, supra note 13, at app. H.
66. See Notice 94-47, 1994-1, C.B. 357. See also Stinnett's Pontiac, 730
F.2d at 638; Estate ofMixon, 464 F.2d at 404.
67. See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
68. See Du Gro Frozen Foods, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1271, 1272
(5th Cir. 1973); Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir.
1965); Provost v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2000-177, 2000 WL 687889, at *7; JAMES S.
EUSTICE & THOMAS BRANTLEY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS T 4.05[2][b][ii] (2017) (noting that "the greater the risk of default
when the day of reckoning finally arrives, the more the purported creditor is locked
into the corporation's fortunes in the same manner as a shareholder").
69. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 467, 469.
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funded project. Because these conditions may indicate that the repayment of
the SIB investment is dependent on the success of the venture rather than based
on an unconditional promise to repay the debt at a fixed maturity date, it is
possible that this factor may support equity characterization."o
3. The Provision ofFixed Interest Rates
Similarly, a provision for a fixed rate of interest that is paid regardless
of whether the entity has profits or losses is another factor the courts consider
as indicative of debt." The Massachusetts SIB provides for the payment of
interest that accrues at a rate of five percent with respect to the advances made
by the Senior Lender and two percent with respect to the advances made by
the Junior Lenders. Payment of this interest is contingent on the availability of
funds resulting from a successful SIB-financed project. However, even though
the certainty of these returns on the investment is not absolute, this factor does
not impair the debt status of an instrument because the contingent return
becomes absolutely enforceable, and not subject to the discretion of the board
of directors, once the condition is satisfied.72 In other words, the right to these
interest payments becomes absolute and does not depend on any discretionary
action on the part of the intermediary when the project achieves a sufficient
70. See, e.g., In re Larson, 862 F.2d 112, 117 (7th Cir. 1988); Wood
Preserving Corp., 347 F.2d at 119; Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399,406-07 (2d Cir.
1957); F.S.A 2001-33-013 (May 16, 2001) (noting that while "every creditor looks to
some extent to the debtor's earnings for payment," current earnings should reasonably
be expected to continue instead of expecting payment upon the hope that an untried
business will succeed); Plumb, supra note 62, at 414-15. But see, e.g., TIFD III-E,
Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
a personal guaranty by a stable corporation and a requirement that 110% of the amount
due be kept in liquid assets decreases the amount of risk associated with the transaction
and is indicative of debt); Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1969);
Ortmayer v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 848, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1959).
71. See John Kelly Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521, 525 (1946); Roth Steel
Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1986); Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1972); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States,
398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968); Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir.
1968); Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1228, 1234 (1952); Third Scottish Am.
Trust Co. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 279, 283 (Ct. Cl. 1941); Brush-Moore
Newspapers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 787, 792 (1938); Plumb, supra note 62, at
431.
72. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 431; see also, e.g., John Kelly Co., 326
U.S. at 525; Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 696; Ortmayer, 265 F.2d at 855; INTERNAL
REv. SERV., PUB. No. 4220, APPLYING FOR 501(c)(3) TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 6 (2014).
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amount of success to trigger payments. As a result, this factor is likely
inconclusive and does not necessarily weigh against debt characterization.
4. Participation in Profits
Generally, a right to participate in the profits of the entity beyond the
amount invested suggests an equity investment.73 However, under certain
circumstances, creditors may also share in the success of an enterprise, in
which case a participation in profits is not indicative of equity. 4 In the case of
the Massachusetts SIB, the contract documents provide for both purported
interest payments, which accrue at a fixed rate, as well as additional payments,
up to a maximum amount, if the project satisfies a higher performance
threshold. The amount of these additional payments, referred to as "success
fees," are calculated on the basis of the cost savings realized by the ultimate
payor, the government, as a result of the SIB-funded program. In other
words, the greater the project's success, the greater the investors' return on
investment. Thus, on the one hand, this factor should weigh in favor of equity
characterization because the investors share in the profits of the enterprise. In
addition, because investors stand to lose their entire investment in the event of
failure, the investors also share in the losses of the enterprise. A participation
in losses may be further indicative of equity because it undermines the
requirement of an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain. On the other
hand, the case law provides that even if a purported lender participates in the
profits of the enterprise, an instrument may be characterized as debt if, in the
absence of additional equity features, there is a reasonable floor or ceiling on
participation and the participation is not in the discretion of the payor.n In the
73. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 442 (noting that equity is indicated when
"an investor truly stands to gain an unlimited amount based on the profits of the
enterprise"); IRS PUB. No. 4220, supra note 72, at 7.
74. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 436 (noting that the payment of a return
that varies with the borrower's profits has been treated as debt); see also Rev. Rul. 68-
54, 1968-1 C.B 69; EUSTICE & BRANTLEY, supra note 68, T 4.05[2][b][vi] (stating
that "[t]he right of investors to participate in the success of an enterprise is not
necessarily inconsistent with a debtor-creditor relationship").
Instead, in the absence of additional adverse factors, this factor is generally a
neutral factor in the debt-equity analysis. See Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69;
Plumb, supra note 62, at 436.
75. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
76. See EUSTICE & BRANTLEY, supra note 68, at T 4.05[2][b][vii].
77. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 437-38 (citing New Eng. Lime Co. v.
Comm'r, 13 T.C. 799, 804 (1949); Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69.
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Massachusetts SIB, the upside potential of any additional payments is capped
and the payment is not discretionary once the contingency is met. Thus, it is
plausible, but not absolute, that this factor may indicate that the SIB
arrangement is equity.
5. Adequacy ofInterest
The provision for a reasonable rate of interest is another factor courts
may consider in characterizing a purported debt instrument.78 In determining
reasonableness, the courts will usually consider whether or not the rate
provided for is commensurate with the risks involved and reflects the amount
that would be charged by an independent creditor.79 As discussed above, the
Massachusetts SIB provides for both a stated interest rate and success
payments as potential compensation for the use of the investors' funds. The
downside risk for investors is that they lose their entire investment, while the
upside potential is capped. 0 Given the contingent nature of these payments
and the limited upside potential, the financial rate of return on the investors'
investment is likely not commensurate with the risks involved." However,
most investors currently invest in SIBs not only for the financial return but
also for a social return on their investment. They are therefore willing to accept
a lower financial rate of return. 82 Moreover, in entering into the Massachusetts
Similarly, in the first Castle Harbour appellate decision, the Second Circuit
concluded that an ability to participate in profits was consistent with a debt
characterization when the upside potential was capped at less than 2.5% of the
investor's capital. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 233-35, 241
(2d Cir. 2006).
78. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir.
1968); Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 83-98,
1983-2 C.B. 40.
79. See Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 697; Curry, 396 F.2d at 634; Rev. Rul.
83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40. Generally, courts tend to find a rate of return that is
significantly higher than the market rate of interest as indicative of equity because
such a high rate would indicate a return for entrepreneurial risk, suggesting, unlike
debt, a sharing of profits. See Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 698; Curry, 396 F.2d at 634.
80. The disproportionate risk-to-return ratio is especially true for the Junior
Lenders in the Massachusetts SIB, who receive a lower rate of return than the Senior
Lenders. Generally, a subordinate lender is entitled to a higher rate of return because
it bears a greater risk that it will not get repaid.
81. However, this does not take into account the nonfinancial return that
comes in the form of a charitable nature.
82. See McKINSEY & Co., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL
IMPACT BONDS TO THE US 39 (2012), http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/
reports/Social-Innovation/McKinseySocial ImpactBondsReport.pdf (describing
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SIB, independent parties have agreed to these terms, which further indicates
that the rate is arm's length. These factors suggest that this is a reasonable rate
of return and, therefore, weighs in favor of debt characterization.
6. Source ofPayments
The expected source for repayment of a purported debt is another
factor that courts consider in determining whether to characterize an
instrument as debt or equity.83 Generally, if the source of repayment is solely
from the earnings of the entity or if the most likely source of repayment is the
liquidation of the enterprise's assets, then the courts view this factor as
indicative of equity.84 With respect to the Massachusetts SIB, the terms of the
agreement provide that the project intermediary will use its liquid assets to pay
the lenders their outstanding interests, principal balance, and any success
payments, which would generally be indicative of equity." However, the SIB
agreement essentially guarantees the project intermediary's solvency for the
SIB investors, because it contractually obligates the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to pay the project intermediary if certain conditions are met.
This backstop of state government funding effectively removes the risk that
the intermediary will only have a limited source of funds to repay investors.
Accordingly, this factor suggests that the Massachusetts SIB may be more akin
to debt than equity.
7. Extent ofRights to Participate in Management
The presence or absence of management rights is generally only a
marginal factor in the debt-equity analysis. 86 Management rights, such as
the types of investors that SIBs are likely to attract as philanthropic funders and
"impact first" investors).
In computing the rate, both stated and unstated interest are taken into account.
See, e.g., Potter Elect. Signal & Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r., T.C. Memo 1960-30, 1960 WL
1025, aff'd, 286 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1961) (Tax Court decision about an obligation
issued at a discount).
83. See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 405 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1986);
Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 730 F.2d 634, 638-39 (11th Cir. 1984);
Estate ofMixon, 464 F.2d at 405. See also Creston Corp. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 932, 938
(1963); IRS PuB. No. 4220, supra note 72, at 10.
85. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H.
86. See IRS PUB. No. 4220, supra note 72, at 9.
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voting rights, are held by owners of an entity." However, creditors often also
have voting and other rights in place to protect their interests." Thus, the
existence of management rights does not necessarily give rise to an equity
interest." Similarly, the absence of voting rights does not necessarily give rise
to a debt instrument. 90 In the case of the Massachusetts SIB, the investors take
on a passive role. 9' These investors are not given rights to participate in the
active management of the program, but their consent is required to make
certain modifications, such as changes to the project fees, funding schedule,
and number of program participants. 92 These rights are limited and are
consistent with rights often given to lenders. Thus, this factor is likely to be
only slightly in favor of debt characterization.
8. Extent ofSubordination
Another factor courts consider in characterizing an instrument is
whether the instrument is subordinate to, or has preference over, any
indebtedness of the corporation. 93 Because creditors' claims on income and on
assets generally have priority over those of the owners or shareholders, courts
have recognized subordination as a factor indicative of equity. 94 The weight
given to the subordination factor depends on the degree to which an interest is
87. See Stinnett's Pontiac, 730 F.2d at 639; Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at
406; Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968); Notice
94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; IRS PuB. No. 4220, supra note 72, at 7.
88. See Helvering v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 90
F.2d 971, 974-75 (4th Cir. 1937); Plumb, supra note 62, at 447-49.
89. See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 374, 399-400 (1967),
affd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1964); IRS PUB. No. 4220, supra note 72, at 7.
90. For instance, some equity interests, such as preferred stock or a
partnership interest, may lack voting rights but nevertheless constitute a capital
investment. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 238
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that "the denial of participation in management to an investor
is a factor which tends, even if only slightly, to favor a conclusion that the interest
resembles debt"); Plumb, supra note 62, at 449.
91. This may not always be the case. A SIB may also be structured to give
the investors an active role in managing the service providers and SIB-funded
program.
92. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H (providing that the lenders
will generally not have voting rights with respect to actions taken by the oversight and
operating committees).
93. See I.R.C. § 385(b); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694,
696 (3d Cir. 1968); Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.
94. See Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 308, 315 (7th
Cir. 1972); Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.
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subordinated, but generally is not itself determinative." In the Massachusetts
SIB, the rights of the lenders during the last few project quarters generally
have preference over the claims of any other creditors of the intermediary."
Specifically, according to the agreement, during these project quarters, the
Senior Lender, and then the Junior Lenders, are entitled to receive interest
payments and a return of their principal first before any other party receives
payments from the project intermediary.97 Thus, during these quarters, the
lenders have a payment priority relative to the other claimants." However,
upon the maturity date, the lenders' rights to receive any remaining
outstanding principal and interest payments are subordinate to the rights of the
other creditors to receive outstanding project fees incurred in connection with
the project, including the payment rights of the project's evaluator, the
project's validator, Third Sector Capital Partners, and the service provider. 99
Because the lenders' rights to payment are not subordinate to the other
claimants during the majority of the investment's duration, and any
subordination upon maturity is to the claims of specific creditors, this factor is
most likely to favor debt characterization."oo
9. Other Factors
Some factors, such as the identity of the interest between the holders
of the instrument and the owners of the entity, the satisfaction of the
independent creditor test, the existence of thin capitalization, and the use of
the funds, are generally only relevant in situations involving non-arm's length
instruments. o' Thus, these factors are irrelevant in the case of the
95. See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394,410 (5th Cir. 1972);
Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 298 (5th Cir. 1967); Liflans Corp. v. United
States, 390 F.2d 965, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
96. However, the rights of the Junior Lenders are subordinate to the claims
of the Senior Lender. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H.
97. See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
98. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H. Specifically, the lenders
have a right to receive these payments before the deferred service fees are paid to the
intermediary's owner, Third Sector Capital Partners, and the service provider, as well
as any other claimant. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Plumb, supra note 62, at 424-25 (indicating that the case law
suggests that "subordination to mortgage debt ... to bank credit or to the claims of
other specific creditors" does not adversely affect an obligation's purported debt status
whereas subordination to the claims of general creditors is a strong indication of
equity).
101. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 409 (5th Cir.
1972); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968); Fischer
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Massachusetts SIB because no related parties are involved. In addition,
depending on the particular jurisdiction, other factors may be considered when
analyzing the character of a transaction.
10. Summary ofFactors
In applying the above factors to the Massachusetts SIB, it is not
entirely clear whether or not the instrument should be respected as debt for tax
purposes. On the one hand, several factors point towards debt characterization:
(1) the parties' intent that the instrument be treated as debt, (2) the adequacy
of the interest provided by the SIB, (3) the source of repayment, (4) the limited
rights to participate in management, and (5) the payment preference that the
lenders have over the other claimants. Moreover, the existence of a contingent,
rather than fixed, rate of interest does not necessarily prevent a debt
designation. 10 2 On the other hand, the absence of an unconditional promise to
pay the principal at a fixed maturity date and the investors' participation in the
profits and loss of the enterprise are two factors that may favor an equity
characterization. Because no particular factor is conclusive in distinguishing
debt from equity, different courts may weigh the factors differently and reach
different conclusions as to the correct characterization of the SIB
arrangement.1 03
v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 32, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For instance, the identity of
ownership factor looks to whether advances made by the owners of the entity are
proportional to their respective equity interest in the entity. See I.R.C. § 385(b);
Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 696; Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357. The more
disproportionate the holdings, the more likely the parties are acting as independent
third parties and the more likely the purported debt form of a transaction will be
respected. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty, 398 F.2d at 696-97. The independent creditor test
looks to the ability of the entity to obtain funds from third-party lenders on similar
terms at the time the advance is made. "Thin capitalization is strong evidence of a
capital contribution where: (1) The debt-to-equity ratio was initially high; (2) the
parties realized that it would likely go higher; and (3) substantial portions of these
funds were used for the purchase of capital assets and for meeting expenses needed to
commence operations." Provost v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2000-177, 2000 WL 687889,
at *7.
102. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. See also Shu-Yi Oei &
Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements, 68 VAND.
L. REv. 681, 719 (2015).
103. See John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946); Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., v. Comm'r, 528 F.2d 917, 919-20 (4th Cir.
1975); Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 402; Helvering v. Richmond, Fredericksburg &
Potomac R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1937); Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.
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B. Are SIBs Equity?
Based on an analysis of the above factors, a SIB arrangement may also
potentially be treated as creating an equity interest. In general, an equity
interest may be treated as: (1) a corporate equity interest or (2) a partnership
or joint-venture interest. 104
1. Corporate Equity Interest
Whether the SIB model creates a corporate equity interest depends on
how the SIB arrangement is defined. On the one hand, the SIB may be framed
as a contract between the project intermediary and the project investors. For
instance, in the Massachusetts SIB, the investors enter into an agreement with
the project intermediary rather than with the government or the service
provider. The documents refer to the intermediary as the "borrower," or the
recipient of the funds. In exchange for the funds, the intermediary promises to
repay the investor its capital plus a return on investment if the project meets
certain performance thresholds, which the intermediary plays a key role in
managing. Furthermore, the project documents also provide that the investor
is entitled to seniority in repayment and a pre-negotiated, although contingent,
rate of return. Accordingly, one possibility is that this arrangement is
equivalent to the intermediary corporation issuing an equity interest in the
form of preferred shares with limited voting rights and a capped return that is
contingent on the success of the business."os However, this characterization of
the traditional SIB model may be problematic to the parties involved. In the
SIBs launched to date in the United States, the organization serving as the
project intermediary has generally been a tax-exempt entity. If the
intermediary is treated as accessing capital from and distributing profits to
equity investors, it can lose its tax-exempt status, thereby subjecting it to tax
liability. 106
Alternatively, the SIB arrangement may instead be defined as a series
of contracts between the government, the service providers, and the investors,
with the intermediary linking the multiple stakeholders together. o7 Under
such an arrangement, the intermediary may merely be serving as the conduit
104. See Oei & Ring, supra note 102, at 720.
105. See id. at 722 (discussing how income share agreements could be
characterized as an equity-like preferred stake in a specific person or the transaction
that the person has undertaken).
106. See Camden Hutchinson, The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity
Distinction, 18 FLA. TAX REv. 95 (2015); Benjamin M. Leff, Preventing Private
Inurement in Tranched Social Enterprises, 45 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 24 (2015).
107. See McKINSEY & Co., supra note 82.
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through which funds flow from the government to the investors if the project
is successful. In particular, under the traditional SIB model, the intermediary
enters into an agreement with both the government and the investors. Its
agreement with the government generally provides that the intermediary will
provide funds to the service providers and manage the project in exchange for
an agreed service fee. In its agreement with the investors, the intermediary
promises to transfer any government payments to the investors minus the
intermediary's management fee and related expenses. Thus, in effect, the SIB
investors transfer funds through the intermediary to pay the nonprofit service
providers, and the government agrees to pay any success fees to the project
investors indirectly through the intermediary.'o Moreover, if a SIB, such as
in the case of the Massachusetts SIB, provides the investors with a lien and
security interest in the intermediary's right to the payments from the
government, this further supports treating the intermediary as a conduit for the
project funds. If the SIB arrangement is framed in this manner, then it is less
likely that the SIB creates an equity interest in any corporate intermediary.
Ultimately, however, this determination depends on the role that the
intermediary plays in the arrangement. In cases where the intermediary plays
an integral role in 4nanaging the project and coordinating the parties, then
corporate equity treatment may be a more plausible characterization. '09
Alternatively, in cases where the intermediary only serves as the fiscal agent
through which funds flow, then equity characterization may not make sense.
2. Partnership or Joint Venture Interest
Alternatively, SIB arrangements may potentially give rise to a
partnership or joint venture. In fact, a SIB has often been defined as "a
multistakeholder partnership,""'0 and the original idea was to refer to a social
impact bond as a "social impact partnership.""' Moreover, a partnership
108. See id. at 15.
109. See Oei & Ring, supra note 102, at 722-23 (concluding that an income
share agreement is more similar to corporate equity where "(1) funds have been
raised to support the funding of the recipient's business venture, . . . and/or (2) an
intermediate entity actually plays a key role in the arrangement").
110. See, e.g., Social Impact Bond Act, H.R. 4885, 113th Cong. (2014)
(describing the proposed Social Impact Bond Act as a bill "[t]o encourage and support
partnerships between public and private sectors to improve our nation's social
programs, and for other purposes") (emphasis added); see also McKINSEY & CO.,
supra note 82, at 13 (defining a SIB as "a multistakeholder partnership managed
through a series of contracts" between the government, the service providers, the
investors, and the intermediary).
I11. See MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 82, at 13.
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characterization may more accurately describe the economic substance of the
SIB arrangement. Thus, if the Service concludes that the debt-equity analysis
applied above gives rise to partnership equity rather than a debtor-creditor
relationship, the Service may recharacterize the transaction as creating a
separate partnership entity for tax purposes.' 12
In particular, a separate partnership entity can arise for tax purposes if
participants "carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and
divide the profits therefrom.""' A partnership includes a "syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on." 114
Because SIBs currently are designed to address one specific social problem,
one partnership that may arise from the series of contracts between the
multiple parties involved in a SIB is a joint venture between the investors and
the project intermediary."'
In general, to constitute a joint venture for tax purposes, the following
attributes must be present: (1) an express or implied contract to form a business
venture, (2) the contribution of assets or services by each of the parties, (3)
joint control and proprietorship, and (4) an agreement to share profits." 6 The
majority of these factors appear to be met under the traditional SIB model.
For instance, in the Massachusetts SIB, the investors and project
intermediaryjoin together to establish a venture that aims to reduce recidivism
112. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220,
231-32 (2d Cir. 2006); Am. Underwriters, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1996-548,
1996 WL 726365, at *5; Provost v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2000-177, 2000 WL 687889,
at *8-9; Rev. Rul. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 50; Oei & Ring, supra note 102, at 744; Elliot
Manning, Partnerships-Conceptual Overview, 710-3d TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA)
§ II.E.2.
113. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2). However, a joint venture to share expenses
and mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or
leased does not constitute a separate entity for federal tax purposes. See id.
114. I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2). Although not controlling, a partnership
has been similarly defined for state law purposes to include "an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997)
§ 102(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
115. See Brady v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 682, 688 (1955) (recognizing that "[o]ne
of the characteristics of a joint venture is that it usually is formed to handle a single
transaction, rather than to carry on a continuing business."); Manning, supra note 112,
at § II.E.2 (noting that "a joint venture is usually an arrangement for a single project").
However, in the future, it is possible that a SIB will address multiple projects,
rather than just one project, in which case, this arrangement may not create a joint
venture but still give rise to a partnership.
116. See S. & M. Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 702, 707 (1971),
acq., 1971-2 C.B. 1; Brady, 25 T.C. at 688; Dagher, supra note 9, at 3510.
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and improve employment outcomes for former juvenile inmates in a particular
area. The investors and intermediary share the same goal, and achieving this
goal will lead to profits, in the form of success payments and services fees
from the government, which suggests that this first factor is satisfied.' The
second attribute also appears to exist, because there is a mutual contribution
of assets or services to the venture. The investors provide the capital or cash
to finance the social intervention, and the project intermediary provides
general contractor-type services by managing the service provider(s) and the
SIB project.
However, the third attribute, which requires joint proprietorship and
control, is not necessarily present. In the current SIB model, the investors and
intermediary do not share control of the project."' Instead, the intermediary
exerts the majority of the control over the project, while investors generally
have little input as to how the program is managed or implemented. "9
Nevertheless, this may not always be the case. It is possible for a SIB-financed
project to involve investors that take on a more active role in managing the
project. Also, some investors currently may influence which service providers
are selected to implement the SIB-financed project.1 2 0
Finally, as one commentator has noted, "the fourth factor of shared
profits could be met in SIBs that extend a performance bonus to the project
intermediary in addition to paying investors when successful." 21 Thus, in
SIBs where both the investors and the intermediary are entitled to a return if
certain performance thresholds are met, this factor may be satisfied. In other
words, if the venture is sufficiently successful, then both parties to the venture
receive a share of the profits. This does not appear to be the case with the
Massachusetts SIB, but based on the foregoing, it is not inconceivable that the
Service could treat a SIB arrangement with these terms as a joint venture, and
therefore, a partnership for tax purposes.
A partnership characterization is also more likely in cases where no
intermediary is used. For instance, in some SIB models, the service provider
that delivers the intervention to the target population acquires funds from
outside investors with repayment contingent on the service provider's success.
This situation looks like multiple partnerships between the service provider,
as the service partner, and each investor, as the capital partner. 122 Moreover,





122. However, if the arrangement is structured so that the service provider
delivering the intervention funds the project upfront from its own funds and is
reimbursed by the government with a small return if it is successful, the arrangement
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in other SIB models, the government may raise funds from the investors
directly and transfer the funds to the service provider. This situation looks like
a partnership between the government and the private investor to achieve a
particular social outcome.
C. IfNot Debt or Equity, What Are They?
The foregoing discussion reveals that a SIB arrangement does not
necessarily fall into the debt or equity characterization for U.S. tax purposes.
Thus, it is possible that a SIB arrangement is treated as neither debt nor equity
but as something else, such as a derivative instrument or a charitable
donation. 123
1. Derivative Instrument
One possibility is that a SIB constitutes a type of derivative financial
instrument. Broadly speaking, a derivative is a "risk-shifting financial contract
... whose payment terms are determined by or derive from the value of the
underlying transaction."1 24 A SIB arrangement is also essentially a "risk-
would likely not be classified as a partnership but as a service contract. This
arrangement looks more like a pay-for-success contract between the government and
the service provider with no SIB element.
123. According to a leading commentator, Michael S. Farber, in addition to
debt and equity, there exists a third way to characterize financial instruments. He refers
to this third characterization as "non-debt open transactions (NOTs)." Farber, supra
note 55, at 636. Generally, instruments that should be characterized as NOTs are fully
paid instruments that have features that prevent an equity characterization but also
lack most of the classic features of debt, such as an unconditional right to receive back
the principal amount or to receive noncontingent stated or discounted interest. Id. at
637. In other words, an instrument is a NOT if the instrument is not taxed as simple
debt or equity. Id. at 637, 643 (arguing that prepaid forwards, credit-linked notes, and
reverse and mandatory exchangeables are examples of NOTs). Because a SIB
arrangement lacks an unconditional right to the payment of its principal and the SIB's
stated interest, but also has a term to maturity and other features that may preclude
characterization as equity, a SIB may fall into this NOT characterization. Once an
instrument is determined to be a NOT, the next step is to determine how it is taxed.
Id. at 637. Under current law, a NOT is potentially subject to several different tax
regimes. Id. at 638.
124. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS T 57.1 (2017) (quoting C.T. Plambeck et al., General
Report, 80b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT'L 653, 657 (1995)). Neither the Internal
Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations define the term "derivative" for tax
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shifting financial contract," because by entering into a SIB, the government
shifts the performance and financial risks associated with funding certain
social service activities to investors.' 25 Moreover, the terms of the SIB specify
that the payment rights and obligations of the parties derive from the value of
an underlying transaction.126 The underlying transaction in this case is the
implementation of a particular social program that has been funded with the
investors' capital. The value of this underlying transaction derives from the
program's achievement of or failure to reach predetermined objective target
outcomes. Generally, this value is translated into monetary terms by taking
into account the amount of expected government savings that would
potentially result from the achievement of these target outcomes. Thus, it is
possible that a SIB arrangement constitutes a derivative instrument.
If a SIB arrangement is considered a derivative instrument, the next
question is what type of derivative is it? The current tax law does not tax all
derivative instruments consistently but rather employs a "cubbyhole"
system.127 As a result, the tax treatment of a SIB as a derivative instrument
will depend on how it is categorized for tax purposes.1 28 Common types of
derivative instruments include options, futures, forwards, and notional
principal contracts. 29 Although a SIB arrangement does not neatly fall into
purposes. Yoram Keinan, United States Federal Taxation ofDerivatives: One Way or
Many?, 61 TAX LAW. 81, 88 (2007).
125. Max Liang et al., An Overview ofSocial Impact Bonds, 13 J.INT'L BUS.
& L. 267, 274 (2014); Davies, supra note 2, at 5; N.Y. FACT SHEET, supra note 14.
126. The fact that the entire value of the payment rights derives from the
value of the underlying transaction, rather than from the creditworthiness of the SIB's
project intermediary or the government, also suggests that the SIB arrangement may
be characterized as something other than indebtedness. See F.S.A. 2001-31-015 (May
2, 2001); F.S.A. 2001-30-010 (Apr. 23, 2001); Kleinbard & Nijenhuis, supra note 55.
127. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 110TH CONG., JCX-21-08,
PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVES 12
(2008); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's
Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1319, 1320 (1991); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES 783, 799 (1993)
(recognizing that the tax law relies on formalistic measures to determine the tax
consequences of derivative instruments).
128. See JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, supra note 127. The tax rules for
derivatives are comprised of various common law rules that have developed over time
and piecemeal statutes and regulations that have been issued to address specific
problems created by the common law rules. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124,
¶ 57.1.
129. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, ¶ 57.1. Under some
circumstances, it may also be possible to bifurcate a derivative instrument into its
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any of the existing categories under current law, for the reasons discussed
below, a SIB arrangement potentially may be treated as a notional principal
contract and taxed accordingly.130
A notional principal contract is a "financial contract that provides for
the payment of amounts by one party to another at specified intervals
calculated by reference to a specified index [based on objective financial
information] upon a notional principal amount in exchange for a specified
consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts."' 3 ' A prepaid swap is a
type of notional principal contract whereby one party generally pays upfront
the present value of the total amount of fixed future payments, while the other
party is contractually obligated to pay an amount that varies based on the value
of the underlying property at a particular date.
A SIB arrangement shares some important features with a prepaid
swap. A SIB arrangement is also a financial contract that obligates one party
to make variable payments at specified future times according to prespecified
conditions and requires the other party to prepay a fixed amount. Specifically,
pursuant to the terms of a SIB arrangement, the government generally pays the
investor an amount that varies based on whether and to what extent an
objective performance threshold is met by a particular date. The other party,
the investor, indirectly prepays the government (through its payments to the
project intermediary to finance the social services) on the effective date of the
contract a fixed, predetermined amount. In addition, similar to a swap
agreement, SIB arrangements may have multiple payout dates.' 32 However,
this is not a feature that is shared by all SIB arrangements.
As with all analogies, the analogy of a SIB to a prepaid forward
contract is not perfect. For instance, a SIB's payout is not based on a notional
amount but rather is based on the actual amount of funds that the investor
various components and subject each to a different tax regime. See Farber, supra note
55, at 638.
130. A SIB arrangement would not be treated as an option because investors
are not paying for the right to purchase or sell an asset at a specified price in the future.
See David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax Treatment of Economically Equivalent
Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity
Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX. REv. 471, 485 (1997).
A SIB arrangement also does not fall into the "futures" category because futures
contracts are exchange-traded agreements rather than privately negotiated or over-the-
counter agreements. See JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, supra note 127, at 6.
131. Reg. § 1.446-3(c).
132. See, e.g., N.Y. Agreement, supra note 13, at 15, 18 (providing that
measurement and performance-based payments are made at two different periods of
time); UTAH PRESCHOOL FACT SHEET, supra note 34 (indicating that the performance
metrics are evaluated and generate a success payment on an annual basis).
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transferred to the SIB intermediary prior to the time that the objective financial
information is available. Moreover, the SIB arrangement likely does not create
the timing abuses that the tax regime for notional principal contracts is
intended to address. 133 Finally, it is unclear whether these differences are
significant enough to preclude a SIB from being treated as a prepaid swap.
Alternatively, a SIB arrangement may potentially be treated as a cash-
settled prepaid forward contract. A traditional forward contract is a privately
negotiated bilateral agreement that entitles the purchaser to a fixed quantity of
a specified asset at a fixed price for delivery at a specified maturity date.13 4 A
cash-settled prepaid forward contract is a type of forward contract that: (1)
entitles the investor to receive the cash value of the referenced asset, rather
than the asset itself, at a fixed future date; and (2) requires the investor to pay
the issuer at the time the parties enter into the contract."I In other words, if
the value of the underlying property increases, the issuer repays the investor
its initial investment plus the amount by which the asset increased in value. If
the value of the underlying property decreases, then the issuer does not repay
the investor its entire initial investment, but some lesser amount.
On the one hand, a SIB arrangement is also comparable to a cash-
settled prepaid forward contract. For instance, consider the Massachusetts SIB
described above. Pursuant to the terms of the Massachusetts SIB agreement,
an investor is required to make an upfront payment. In exchange, the
government (through the intermediary) will repay the investor that amount if
the specified social program meets certain objective performance metrics. To
the extent that the program exceeds those performance metrics, the
government will transfer an additional amount of cash to the investor
calculated on a sliding scale on the basis of the expected government
budgetary savings from the social program's success.' Thus, like a cash-
settled prepaid forward contract, the SIB arrangement involves an upfront
payment and entitles the investor to a cash payment, the amount of which
depends on the value of the underlying transaction. If the program fails to
133. See Philip Robin Cleary, Predicting the Taxation of Prediction
Markets, 27 VA. TAX. REv. 953, 974 (2008) (concluding that prediction markets do
not constitute notional principal contracts for similar reasons).
134. See JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, supra note 127, at 6-7.
135. See id. at 7. One common example of a prepaid forward contract is the
S&P Forward. Generally, on the date the instrument is issued, the investor pays the
issuer an amount of cash that is equivalent to the present value of a certain amount of
S&P stock. In exchange, the investor acquires the right to receive at some future date
the cash value of an equivalent amount of S&P stock that is calculated as of the
maturity date. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 7-8; Farber, supra note 55,
at 640.
136. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
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satisfy the minimum performance threshold, then the value of the transaction
is deemed to be zero and the government does not repay the investor any of its
capital.
On the other hand, SIBs also differ from cash-settled prepaid forward
contracts in several respects. First, the SIB arrangement is not a bilateral
executory contract. Instead, a traditional SIB arrangement involves the
government, the intermediary, and the investors. This difference should not
preclude characterization as a prepaid forward contract. It is plausible that the
intermediary may be viewed as an agent or conduit, in which case the essence
of the transaction is between the government and investors. Alternatively, the
arrangement may be viewed as two separate prepaid forward contracts: one
between the government and intermediary and the other between the
intermediary and investors, in which case the contracts become bilateral
executory contracts.
Second, a potentially more significant difference is that the payout
from a SIB arrangement does not depend on the value of a specific asset.
Instead, it generally depends on the projected value of the government savings
resulting from a specific social program and the satisfaction of predetermined
performance metrics. This raises the question: does the success of a particular
social program constitute property? In other words, does a SIB arrangement
have underlying property? It may be possible to argue that the right to be paid
a certain amount based on whether or not an event occurs in a particular time
period is not entirely unlike a property interest.' 3 7 Thus, this right, which has
value but no physical substance, may constitute intangible property.13 8 But
there is also a strong argument that objective performance metrics do not
constitute an asset for these purposes.
In conclusion, even though the parties refer to the transaction as a
"loan" from the investor to the intermediary, this transaction may be classified
either as a prepaid swap arrangement or a cash-settled prepaid forward contract
for tax purposes. 13 9 Both instruments may resemble a contingent or variable-
rate loan, which makes them especially similar to a typical SIB arrangement
and to each other. Both instruments also differ from SIB arrangements in
137. See Cleary, supra note 133, at 968-71 (concluding that the right to
payment generated by prediction derivatives or informational futures may represent
the underlying property of the transaction and therefore qualify the transaction as a
novel kind of prepaid forward contract).
138. See id. (reaching this conclusion with respect to prediction derivatives
or informational futures).
139. See Kleinbard & Nijenhuis, supra note 55, at ch. 392-66 (recognizing
that the issuance of a financial instrument in the form of debt for corporate law
purposes should not preclude the parties from treating it in accordance with its
economic substance).
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several respects so that neither instrument is a perfect analogy to a SIB
arrangement. In particular, as described above, one significant variation is that
a SIB arrangement, unlike a forward contract, does not reference underlying
property that is readily identifiable property. Thus, this Article argues that if a
SIB arrangement is classified as a derivative instrument, it may more likely be
treated as a prepaid swap agreement for tax purposes. However, unless and
until Service guidance is issued, the correct classification of a SIB arrangement
for tax purposes remains uncertain.
2. Charitable Donation
Even if a SIB arrangement does not constitute debt or equity, it is not
likely to give rise to a charitable donation. To qualify as a charitable donation
for which an income tax deduction is allowable, the contribution of funds
generally must meet four requirements: (1) the contribution must involve a
completed transfer of money or property, (2) the contribution must be to a
permissible recipient, (3) the transfer must be voluntary and not trigger an
economic benefit to the donor, and (4) the contribution must be in the correct
form.1 40
A traditional SIB arrangement generally satisfies the first two
requirements. In a SIB arrangement, the investor transfers money to the project
intermediary, thereby meeting the first requirement. 141 The second
requirement is also met because the SIBs launched to date in the United States
have a qualified nonprofit entity as the project intermediary. For instance, one
intermediary used in several SIB arrangements is Third Sector Capital
Partners, Inc., a section 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, whose mission, according
to its website, is to build "evidence-based initiatives to address society's most
persistent challenges." By providing funds to the intermediary as part of a SIB
arrangement, investors effectively support this mission to finance a particular
social program. Moreover, most nonprofit organizations organized and
operated exclusively for charitable purposes constitute qualified organizations
140. Barbara L. Kirschten & Carla Neeley Freitag, Charitable
Contributions: Income Tax Aspects, 863-3d TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) § II.A.
141. To satisfy this requirement, the transfer must generally pass actual
dominion and control over the funds to the donee. Id. at § II.B. This means that the
contribution must be made to, or for the use of, a qualified organization and not be set
aside for use by a specific person or subject to other restrictions concerning their
application. See I.R.C. § 170(c); Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2); Kirschten & Freitag, supra
note 140, at § IV.C. Generally, in a SIB, the intermediary organization, rather than the
investor, selects the service provider(s) to which it will ultimately transfer the funds.
Thus, it is plausible that the funds are not set aside for a specific person but rather are
under the control of the project intermediary.
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for these purposes. 142 Thus, funds contributed to a nonprofit project
intermediary, such as Third Sector Capital Partners, Inc., are transferred to a
permissible donee.'3
Even if a qualified organization operates as the project intermediary,
the third requirement that the transfer does not involve the receipt of economic
benefit likely precludes a SIB arrangement from qualifying as a deductible
charitable contribution. To satisfy this requirement, the donor must (1) intend
to make a gift to the charity in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of
the goods or services received by the donor, and (2) in fact make a payment in
an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services.'4 Under
the current SIB model, the investor potentially receives a financial return if the
program is successful. This means that the investor receives a return benefit,
in the form of a cash payment, from the project intermediary that exceeds its
initial transfer of money to the intermediary, thereby disqualifying it from the
charitable contribution deduction.
However, an investor may not necessarily recoup its initial capital or
receive any other return benefit as a result of transferring funds to the project
intermediary. The SIB arrangement is purposefully structured so that if the
project is unsuccessful, the investor does not recover its investment and
receives nothing in return for the use of its funds. In other words, if the
program were unsuccessful, the investor would have transferred money that
exceeds the value of any return benefit. It is plausible that the investor intended
to make a gift of these funds. Given the binary and speculative nature of these
new SIB arrangements, which currently offer investors a below-market, risk-
adjusted rate of return, SIBs often attract investors that, at least partially, seek
a nonfinancial return on their investment. For instance, investors appear to
invest in SIBs for reasons that include a desire to create meaningful social
change through investment, "to be seen as doing good for society and burnish
142. See I.R.C. § 170(c).
143. The Service lists Third Sector Capital Partners, Inc. as a public charity
that is a qualified organization to which deductible contributions under Code section
170(c) may be made. See Exempt Organizations Select Check, IRS.GOv, https://apps.
irs.gov/app/eos/pub78Search.do?einl=46-1301032&names=Third+Sector+Capital+
Partners&city=&state=All ... &country=US&deductibility--all&dispatchMethod=sear
chCharities&submitName=Search (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). However, if a for-
profit project intermediary is used, as is expected in the future, then the transfer to the
intermediary will not qualify as a charitable contribution even though a nonprofit
service provider, which uses the funds for a charitable purpose, is the ultimate
recipient of the funds.
144. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1); Kirschten & Freitag, supra note 140, at
§ II.E.1.a.
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their reputations," or to generate the greatest charitable yield out of every
dollar.145 This suggests some element of donative intent.
Despite the foregoing, "it is the expectation of a benefit, not whether
the expectations are ultimately realized" that governs whether the transaction
satisfies this third requirement.14 6 Thus, regardless of whether or not the SIB
project is successful, the investor is treated as receiving an economic benefit
to the extent of its expected economic return at the time of the transfer. The
actual economic return that it ultimately does or does not receive is irrelevant.
Accordingly, in the case of individual investors, the transaction is likely not to
qualify for the charitable contribution deduction.' 4 7
In sum, SIBs are hybrid instruments that have debt, equity, and
charitable features. They do not fit neatly into any existing characterization for
tax law purposes. As a result, it is difficult to definitively conclude how they
should be treated under current law. Each of the alternatives discussed above
are plausible characterizations.
III. TAx CONSEQUENCES TO PRIVATE INVESTORS
The tax consequences to investors of a SIB investment ultimately
depend on its characterization for tax purposes and whether the investor is a
private or nonprofit investor. Based on the foregoing discussion, several
potential options exist for how traditional SIB investments are characterized
under current law. Moreover, modifications to the traditional SIB model may
145. GOODALL, supra note 12, at 11; Davies, supra note 2, at 5; Making an
Impact with Philanthropy, MERRILL LYNCH PRIV. BANKING & INv. GROUP, https://
www.pbig.ml.com/articles/making-an-impact-with-philanthropy.html (last visited
May 4, 2017).
146. Kirschten & Freitag, supra note 140, § II.E.1.b.2; see also Stubbs v.
United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970); Singer Co. v. United States, 449
F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Under the traditional SIB model, the investor receives
the economic benefits directly from the project intermediary and indirectly from the
government. However, it does not matter whether the economic benefits are received
from the donee or a third party. See Singer, 449 F.2d at 423; C.C.A. 2002-38-041 (July
24, 2002); Kirschten & Freitag, supra note 140, at § II.E.1.b.5.
147. To the extent that this expected economic benefit does not exceed the
investor's contribution to the project intermediary, the investor's contribution may
qualify for the charitable contribution deduction if the transferor intended to make a
gift of this excess to the project intermediary. But the difficulty lies in determining the
amount of the investor's expected economic benefits at the time of the transfer given
the speculative and novel nature of the SIB arrangement. As a practical matter, if the
transferor is unable to determine the value of the return benefit received, the transferor
cannot calculate the amount deductible as a charitable contribution. See Kirschten &
Freitag, supra note 140, at § II.E.l.b.5.
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alter the economics of the transaction and the character of the transaction.
Thus, the tax consequences to a private investor in the SIB arrangement will
vary depending on how the transaction is ultimately characterized. Below, I
briefly describe the resulting tax consequences of a debt, corporate equity,
partnership, and prepaid swap agreement characterization.
A. Debt Instrument
If the SIB arrangement were treated as a debt instrument, then
participating in the SIB investment may generate interest income to the
investors. 148 In particular, under the traditional SIB model, investors are
entitled to receive a predetermined return on their investment if certain
performance thresholds are satisfied. For instance, the Massachusetts SIB,
described above, provides that the project intermediary will pay the Senior
Lender a five percent return on its investment on a quarterly basis to the extent
of available funds. Accordingly, if the advance is considered a loan to the
project intermediary, then this return will constitute interest income to the
Senior Lender. Because interest income is treated as ordinary income, this
income will be subject to tax at a marginal tax rate of 39.6% for high-income
taxpayers. 19 This income may also be subject to a 3.8% surtax that is imposed
on net investment income, thereby increasing the effective rate of tax on this
income to 43.4%. '
However, unlike a traditional bond investor, a SIB investor generally
will not receive any incremental payments from the intermediary prior to the
point in time that the project is deemed successful. Moreover, the SIB
investor's right to these payments is contingent on the project reaching certain
performance thresholds. Nevertheless, regardless of the project's ultimate
success, the investor may have to recognize interest income, and be subject to
tax, on an annual basis under the noncontingent bond method. This method
may be deemed to apply because one or more payments are not fixed, but are
148. See Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54 (defining interest as "the amount
one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money, and as the compensation
paid for the use or forbearance of money").
149. I.R.C. § 1. A SIB, as currently structured, would likely not constitute a
municipal bond that generates tax-free municipal bond interest under Code section
103. See VALERIE DAO ET AL., PRACTICUM TEAM, UNIV. OF CHIC. HARRIS SCH. OF
PUB. POLICY STUDIES, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE
WYMAN TEEN OUTREACH PROGRAM, http://128.135.46.110/sites/default/files/practica
/spring20l2-report2.pdf (last visited May 5, 2017).
150. I.R.C. § 1411 (imposing a 3.8% surtax on the lesser of a taxpayer's net
investment income or the excess of the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income
over a specified threshold).
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instead contingent, when the instrument was issued. 1' Pursuant to this
method, interest would be required to be taken into account regardless of
whether the amount of the payment is fixed or determinable in the taxable
year. 152 If the actual amount of the contingent payment differs from the
amount included in income for the year, then appropriate adjustments are made
to reflect the difference at that time.'
The SIB investor is likely also to have tax consequences at the
termination of the SIB project. If the project is successful, then any payments
that the investor receives on the retirement of the debt instrument to the extent
of its basis in the instrument will be a nontaxable return of capital. 154 In
addition, any payments that the investor receives in excess of its "interest" and
principal repayment would likely be treated as capital gain under the
noncontingent bond method. i" If the project is unsuccessful and the investor
loses its investment, then the investor will likely recognize a capital loss.'5 6
B. Corporate Equity
If the SIB arrangement instead were characterized as an equity interest
in a corporation, then the resulting tax consequences may differ in several
respects. From the investor's perspective, one difference is the timing of when
the investor has to recognize income for tax purposes. As discussed above, if
the SIB arrangement is characterized as debt, then the investor may have to
recognize any return on investment as income prior to the time that it receives
any payments. But if the instrument is characterized as corporate equity and
the return on investment represents dividend income, then generally the
investor will only be subject to tax at the time the dividend is distributed.
Moreover, the income that the investor receives from its SIB investment will
151. Reg. § 1.1275-4(a) (stating that this method applies to certain debt
instruments that provide for one or more contingent payments).
152. Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(2).
153. Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(3).
154. See I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1).
155. I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1) (treating the "retirement" of a debt instrument as an
exchange of the instrument, which means that if the amount received exceeds the basis
in the debt instrument and the debt is being held as a capital asset, then a capital gain
may arise).
156. See I.R.C. §§ 166(d)(1)(B) (providing that "where any nonbusiness
debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be
considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset
held for not more than 1 year"), 1271(a)(1). In the event that the SIB investment is
evidenced by a security, then the loss may give rise to a long-term capital loss. See
I.R.C. § 165(g).
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be subject to different tax rates depending on the instrument's characterization.
In particular, if the return on investment represents qualified dividend, income
then it generally will be subject to tax at the preferential tax rates applicable to
capital gains, while interest income is treated as ordinary income.'
There may also be differences with respect to the recovery of the
investment. Specifically, a holder of a debt instrument will generally receive
the repayment of their initial advance tax free, but a shareholder in a
corporation will not always receive the same amount tax free. Instead, current
distributions from a corporation generally will be treated as dividends to the
extent of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation.' This means
that the investor may have taxable income even though the payments may
represent the repayment of their initial investment. However, this is not always
the case. Under some circumstances, such as a complete redemption of the
investor's interest in the corporation, the investor will recover its basis tax free
and any excess will be treated as a capital gain.' Thus, upon the termination
of the SIB investment, the investor is likely to receive capital gain treatment.
In the event that the SIB investment generates a loss, an equity holder
is likely to be subject to tax treatment similar to that for a debt holder.
Specifically, if the SIB-financed project is unsuccessful and the investor loses
its entire investment, then, regardless of whether the investment is
characterized as debt or equity, the investor will have a capital loss to the
extent of its capital investment. 160
C. Partnership Interest
Alternatively, if the SIB arrangement were characterized as giving rise
to. a partnership interest, then different tax consequences would result. For
instance, the SIB "partnership" would have to separately compute its taxable
income and file an annual information tax return.161 Each partner would then
report its allocated share of the partnership profits or losses on its own tax
return, even if nothing were distributed.1 62 This means that if the SIB project
157. I.R.C. § 1(h)(l 1). This gain will likely be subject to a 23.8% rate of tax
because of the additional 3.8% surtax imposed on net investment income. I.R.C.
§ 1411.
158. I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316(a).
159. See I.R.C. § 302(a)-(b).
160. See I.R.C. §§ 165(g), 1221, 1222.
161. See I.R.C. §§ 703(a), 6031.
162. I.R.C. § 702. A partner's distributive share of partnership income, gain,
deduction, loss, and credit are generally determined by the partnership agreement.
I.R.C. § 704(a). But if the partnership agreement does not provide for the allocation
or lacks substantial economic effect, then the allocation is determined by each
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were successful and the government were to make success payments to the
project intermediary, the amount of those payments that were allocable to the
investor would be income to the investor even prior to the time that the investor
receives any payment. At the time that the investor finally receives
distributions, if any, from the deemed partnership, the investor will not have
any tax consequences unless the investor's basis in the partnership is less than
the amount of the cash distribution.16 1
To illustrate, consider the results if the Massachusetts SIB were
characterized as a partnership. In that case, if the SIB-financed program met
the minimum performance thresholds to trigger success payments from the
government, then those payments would first be allocable to the Senior Lender
until it received a five percent return on its investment. This would constitute
taxable income to the Senior Lender at the time the government transferred the
funds to the project intermediary. Then, each quarter, as the partnership
distributes these amounts to the Senior Lender, the Senior Lender would
receive the payments tax free. Similarly, the Junior Lender would be subject
to tax on its allocable share of any partnership income at the time the
government makes the success payment to the project intermediary.
The character of this income that the investors receive is determined
at the partnership level. 164 Because the partnership is arguably in the business
of delivering a social outcome, it is possible that the success payments the
partnership receives from the government will constitute ordinary operating
income in the hands of the partnership. Therefore, this would also be treated
as ordinary income to the investor. 16' Alternatively, the business of the
partnership may be viewed as investing in social outcomes, in which case the
success payments may constitute capital gains to the partnership and the
partners. Accordingly, the investor's returns instead may be subject to
preferential tax rates. 166
partner's "interest in the partnership" under all the facts and circumstances. I.R.C.
§ 704(b); Reg. § 1.704-1(b).
163. See I.R.C. §§ 721-22, 731-32. In general, the investor's basis in the
partnership is the amount of funds it transferred to the project intermediary, increased
by the investor's allocable share of partnership income and reduced by the investor's
allocable share of any partnership losses and any distributions made to that investor.
See I.R.C. §§ 705(a), 722. Thus, distributions from the partnership to the investor will
generally be tax free unless § 737 or § 751(b) applies.
164. I.R.C. § 702(b).
165. See id. (preserving the character of each item of partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit in the hands of the partners).
166. Individual investors may also be subject to the 3.8% Medicare surtax,
which is imposed on the lesser of "net investment income" or the excess of adjusted
gross income over a threshold amount. I.R.C. § 1411(a). "Net investment income"
472 Florida Tax Review [Vol 20:7
Taxing Social Impact Bonds
If at the termination of the SIB, the SIB-financed project fails to meet
the minimum performance thresholds or does not generate sufficient success
payments to repay the investors their entire initial investment and any accrued
interest, then the investors may recognize a capital loss at that time. 167 The
amount of the loss will be the amount by which the investor's basis in the
partnership exceeds any money distributed to it.' 6 1
D. Derivative Instrument
As discussed above, a SIB arrangement may potentially be
characterized as a prepaid swap agreement. This characterization gives rise to
tax consequences that are substantially similar to the tax implications that arise
when an investor acquires a debt instrument with contingent payments.
Specifically, the noncontingent swap method, which is comparable to
the noncontingent bond method described above, generally governs the tax
consequences of an investor in a swap arrangement. 169 Under this method, an
investor must recognize any nonperiodic payments over the term of the
contract under a reasonable amortization method regardless of when the
payment is actually received. 170 Accordingly, if a SIB arrangement is
includes income generated by a partnership in which the taxpayer is a passive partner.
I.R.C. § 1411(c).
167. See I.R.C. § 73 1(a)(2) (providing that any loss recognized on a
liquidating distribution will be considered a loss from the sale or exchange of a
partnership interest of the distributee partner).
168. Id. Because the investors do not materially participate in the deemed
partnership, the immediate deductibility of the loss may be limited by the passive
activity loss rules. I.R.C. § 465. These rules provide that a passive loss generally may
only offset income generated from the taxpayer's passive activities. Thus, to the extent
that the investor does not have other passive income, the losses from the SIB
investment will be carried forward to a subsequent year. However, because the loss
from a SIB investment generally only arises at the termination of the SIB, which
terminates the joint venture, these losses will be allowed to the extent they exceed the
taxpayer's net income or gain from all passive activities for that year. See I.R.C.
§ 469(g)(1).
169. See Reg. § 1.446-3. A "nonperiodic payment" is any payment made or
received with respect to a notional principal contract that is not payable at intervals of
one year or less during the entire term of the contract and is not a termination payment.
Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(1). Thus, if a SIB arrangement is classified as a prepaid swap
agreement, any success payments made by the government pursuant to a traditional
SIB arrangement likely constitute nonperiodic payments.
170. See Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(1). In the case of swaps, nonperiodic payments
are generally allocated over the term of the contract in accordance with the values of
a series of cash-settled forward contracts that reflect the specific index and the notional
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characterized as a prepaid swap, the investor may have to recognize a portion
of any potential success payments on an annual basis. These payments would
most likely be taxed as ordinary income."'
However, if the SIB arrangement is treated as a prepaid forward
contract instead, then the tax consequences vary significantly. In particular, a
forward contract is generally treated as an open transaction, which means it
does not give rise to any income or loss until the investor terminates or settles
its rights or obligations under the contract. 17 2 Thus, unlike a prepaid swap and
contingent debt, any income generated by the arrangement will likely not be
recognized until the project is deemed successful and the government transfers
funds to the project intermediary. Similarly, as with contingent debt, any loss
will only be recognized at the termination of the contract. In other words, the
investor will recognize gain or loss upon the cash settlement of the contract
rather than over the term of the SIB arrangement. This is likely the result even
though the SIB arrangement involves a prepayment of cash by the investor.173
With respect to the character of any income or loss, the tax law
generally looks to the character of the underlying property involved in the
principal amount. Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(2). Alternatively, a taxpayer may allocate a
nonperiodic payment, other than an upfront payment, by treating the contract as
though it provided for a single upfront payment equal to the present value of the
nonperiodic payments and a loan from the recipient of the nonperiodic payment to the
payor. Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(2)(iii). The deemed upfront payment is amortized by
assuming that the payment represents the present value of a series of equal payments
made throughout the term of the contract based on available market information. This
amortized amount together with the time value component of the assumed loan are
recognized as additional periodic payments. Id. However, for contracts entered into
after November 3, 2015, the transaction may need to be bifurcated into two separate
transactions: (1) an on-market, level payment swap and (2) an embedded loan. Temp.
Reg. § 1.446-3T(g)(4)(i). Pursuant to the temporary regulations, "[tihe time value
component associated with the loan is not included in the net income or net deduction
from the swap . .. , but is recognized as interest for all purposes of the code." Id.
171. See STEVIE D. CONLON & VINCENT M. AQUILINo, PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: U.S. & INTERNATIONAL TAXATION § B 1.09 (2017).
172. See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 195, 198 (1938);
Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363; JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 17.
The tax law applicable to derivative instruments, including forwards, is not fully
developed but instead relies on a collection of unsystematic common law rules. See
BnrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, ¶ 57.1.
173. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 17; Rev. Rul. 2003-7,
2003-1 C.B. 363; Robert W. Wood, Prepaid Forward Contracts: What's All the
Fuss?, M&A TAX REP., http://woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/Prepaid.pdf
(last visited May 4, 2017).
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forward contract.' 74 This depends on whether we can identify any underlying
property for the SIB arrangement. If we treat the right to be paid a certain
amount based on the eventual reality of an event's occurrence or
nonoccurrence as intangible property upon which the SIB arrangement relies,
then this property would constitute a capital asset.' Accordingly, any income
generated by the SIB arrangement would be characterized as a capital gain and
any loss would be characterized as a capital loss.' 76
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO NONPROFIT INVESTORS
In general, a charitable organization is exempt from federal income
taxation. 1n Accordingly, if a philanthropic investor qualifies as a section
501 (c)(3) organization, then any returns that it earns through its investment in
a SIB will be nontaxable. This means that the majority of the tax consequences
discussed above generally will not be relevant to nonprofit investors.
To qualify for tax-exempt treatment, a charitable organization has to
satisfy certain requirements.' This Part discusses how the economics of the
SIB arrangement may affect a nonprofit investor's ability to meet some of
these requirements and may, therefore, jeopardize its tax-exempt status. It also
discusses the potential excise taxes that may apply to private foundations that
invest in a SIB.
A. Loss of Tax-Exempt Status
Under certain circumstances, a nonprofit organization that invests in
a SIB may potentially lose its tax-exempt status by violating the private
inurement doctrine. The private inurement doctrine, also referred to as the non-
distribution constraint, prohibits a charitable organization from distributing the
organization's net earnings to individuals who exercise control over it as a
condition to maintaining its tax-exempt status. ' This provision potentially
affects these organizations when investing in ventures that have equity
174. See I.R.C. § 1234A.
175. See Cleary, supra note 133, at 969 (discussing a similar issue that arises
with respect to prediction markets).
176. See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222, 1234A.
177. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3).
178. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
179. See Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)l(c)(2); Hutchinson, supra note 106, at 838;
Leff, supra note 106, at 24.
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investors. 180 This means that, under certain circumstances, a nonprofit
organization that invests in a SIB may lose its tax-exempt status, thereby
subjecting its returns to the same tax treatment that applies to private investors,
as discussed above.
In particular, this situation may arise if a tax-exempt organization
invests in a social enterprise' ' owned by one or more insiders and if the
investment constitutes an "excessive benefit." 182 Take for instance the
Massachusetts SIB described above. Because of the tranche investment
mechanism employed by the Massachusetts SIB, if the private investor, the
Senior Lender, were related to the tax-exempt investors (i.e., the Junior
Lenders or the grantors), this arrangement may violate the private inurement
doctrine.
Pursuant to the terms of the SIB, the advances made by the Senior
Lenders are subject to a higher rate of return and have the right to payments
before any returns are paid to the Junior Lenders, while the Junior Lenders
take on a greater risk but receive a lower, below-market return on their
investment. In effect, the higher returns, which are closer to a market-rate
return, may be offered to the private investors because the nonprofit investors
are willing to accept lower returns.' Thus, in effect, the tax-exempt investors
may be partially subsidizing the payments made to the Senior Lender.' 8 4 If the
Senior Lender is considered to have some sort of influence or control over the
Junior Lenders, then this investment structure may violate the private
inurement doctrine and the Junior Lenders will lose their tax-exempt status.'s
180. See Leff, supra note 106, at 24. As a result of this requirement, tax-
exempt organizations cannot directly access capital from equity investors. See
Hutchinson, supra note 106; Leff, supra note 106, at 24.
181. A social enterprise has been defined as an entity "organized and
operated for the dual purpose of engaging in profit-making activity and furthering a
social good." Linda 0. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other
Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 5 (2010) (quoted in Leff,
supra note 106, at 2). With respect to the first requirement, a SIB-funded program
does not technically engage in a profit-making activity. However, it generally seeks to
create government savings, which arguably may be considered a form of profit. A
SIB-funded program clearly meets the second requirement of furthering a social good
because its goal is to address a social problem, such as homelessness or recidivism,
among other issues that are typically addressed by governments or charitable
organizations.
182. Leff, supra note 106, at 27.
183. Similarly, the grantors are willing to risk having a zero return on their
investment because they want to promote the social goals of the project.
184. See Leff, supra note 106, at 18.
185. However, "it is not entirely clear what type of relationship constitutes
influence or control or what type of benefit constitutes inurement." Id. at 27. Even if
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Similarly, the SIB arrangement potentially may be treated as violating
the private benefit doctrine, which could also cause a nonprofit investor to lose
its tax-exempt status. The private benefit doctrine provides that a tax-exempt
organization is prohibited from being organized or operated for the benefit of
private individuals, even if the benefited party is a disinterested person.1 6 If
the private benefit is substantial enough that it overwhelms the charity's public
purpose, the nonprofit organization can lose its tax-exempt status. 187
Unfortunately, there is a lot of ambiguity in this area and it is unclear what
constitutes an "insubstantial" private benefit that does not violate the private
benefit doctrine. 8'8 For instance, it is possible that the Service may deem a SIB
arrangement to violate this doctrine when nonprofit investors participate as
Junior Lenders that subsidize the senior lenders' return on investment. This
would occur if the Service interprets the private benefit doctrine to apply "to
any economic transaction in which charitable assets are improperly diverted
to someone other than the charitable beneficiaries."' 8 However, it is also
possible that the Service may interpret the doctrine to only apply where a "non-
charitable purpose has overwhelmed the charitable purpose of the organization
so that the organization no longer really serves its charitable goals."' 90 In this
case, a nonprofit organization could participate as a junior lender in a SIB
the transaction is not treated as violating the private inurement doctrine, under certain
circumstances, the tranche investment structure creates the risk that the Service will
treat the investment in a SIB as an "excess benefit transaction" and impose penalties
pursuant to Code section 4948. For a more thorough discussion of whether investment
in a tranched social enterprise violates the private inurement doctrine or creates an
excess benefit transaction, see Leff, supra 106.
186. The private benefit doctrine is not explicitly contained in the Code.
Instead, it is derived from Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), which requires
that a charitable organization be organized and operated exclusively for a charitable
purpose. See Bruce R. Hopkins, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 537 (10th
ed. 2011); Dagher, supra note 9, at 3488; Leff, supra note 106, at 48. This doctrine
differs from the private inurement doctrine in that the private benefit doctrine applies
even when the person who receives the income or assets from the tax-exempt
organization is a disinterested person, provided that the benefit is considered
excessive. See Leff, supra note 106, at 24.
187. See Leff, supra note 106, at 48.
188. Id. at 49 (noting also that "[t]he IRS has taken the position that a private
benefit must be 'insubstantial' and that insubstantiality should be measured both
'qualitatively' and 'quantitatively"') (footnotes omitted).
189. Leff, supra note 106, at 50.
190. Id. at 51.
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arrangement as long as its investment is insignificant relative to its overall
activities. 191
If the SIB arrangement is characterized as a joint venture,1 92 then the
Service will evaluate the private benefit doctrine under a separate
framework. 193 Unfortunately, this framework is just as ambiguous as the one
described above. 194 Under this framework, it is possible that a nonprofit
investor in a SIB with a tranche investment structure may be deemed to violate
the private benefit doctrine if it does not maintain sufficient control over the
parts of the joint venture relevant to its tax-exempt purpose.1 95
B. Unrelated Business Income Tax
Even if a SIB arrangement is not treated as violating the private benefit
doctrine with respect to its nonprofit investors, the transaction may potentially
result in taxable income to the nonprofit investor if the SIB arrangement is
characterized as ajoint venture. Specifically, tax is imposed on income derived
by a nonprofit entity from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on
by that entity (UBIT).1 96 If the tax-exempt entity "is a partner in a partnership,
the organization's [unrelated business taxable income] includes its distributive
share of the income of any business carried on by the partnership that is not
related to the organization's exempt purposes." '9 Thus, if the SIB
191. See id. The private benefit doctrine potentially also comes up in the SIB
context if the investors' returns, which derive from the successful work of the
nonprofits, constitute a distribution of profits. See Dagher, supra note 9, at 3504. If
this is the case, a tax-exempt organization that serves as the intermediary or service
provider with respect to a SIB-funded program may potentially lose its tax-exempt
status. See id. For an in-depth analysis of whether a nonprofit participating in a SIB
violates the private benefit doctrine, see Dagher, supra note 9.
192. The Service broadly interprets what constitutes ajoint venture for these
purposes. See Leff, supra note 106, at 51-52.
193. See Dagher, supra note 9, at 3495; Leff, supra note 106, at 51-52.
194. See Leff, supra note 106, at 51.
195. See Dagher, supra note 9, at 3495; Leff, supra note 106, at 51. The
Service imposes a different analysis depending on whether the joint venture is a
whole-entityjoint venture or ancillaryjoint venture. See Dagher, supra note 9, at 3495;
Leff, supra note 106, at 51. It is not entirely clear whether or not a control requirement
exists for ancillary joint ventures and if so, what type of control is necessary. See
Dagher, supra note 9, at 3496-98; Leff, supra note 106, at 53-54.
196. See I.R.C. §§ 511, 512. Generally an activity carried on by an exempt
organization with a profit motive is sufficient to constitute a trade or business. See
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, T 103.4.2.
197. BITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, T 103.6.10; see also I.R.C.
§ 512(c).
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arrangement is treated as a joint venture between the investors and the project
intermediary, then the tax-exempt investors must be cautious that all of the
activities carried on by the venture are substantially related to the charitable
purposes of their organizations. However, if the SIB arrangement is
characterized as debt or equity, then any interest or dividend payments will
not give rise to any UBIT. The statute specifically excludes from the UBIT
certain types of passive income, such as dividends, interests, royalties, and
rents. 9
Despite the foregoing, even if the SIB arrangement is characterized as
a joint venture, UBIT will not necessarily result. Consider for instance the
Massachusetts SIB. If this arrangement is characterized as a joint venture, it
will not likely give rise to UBIT, because the purpose of the venture is to
provide relief to underprivileged individuals and promote social welfare by
addressing juvenile delinquency. 199 These goals are consistent with the
charitable purposes shared by the tax-exempt investors.200
C Excise Taxes
In addition to the potential tax implications discussed above, if a
philanthropic investor that qualifies as a tax-exempt organization constitutes a
private foundation,20 1 then any returns that it earns through its investment in a
SIB may be subject to additional taxes. Specifically, these private foundations
potentially may be liable for excise taxes on: (1) net investment income, (2)
investments that jeopardize charitable purposes, (3) a failure to distribute
income, and (4) excess business holdings.
198. See I.R.C. § 512(b).
199. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H.
200. Specifically, one of the tax-exempt investors, the Kresge Foundation,
seeks to "promote human progress" by expanding opportunities nationwide in "arts
and culture, education, environment, health, human services, and community
development." Who We Are, KRESGE FOUND., http://kresge.org/who-we-are (last
visited May 4, 2017). Similarly, the second tax-exempt investor, Living Cities, is an
organization comprised of numerous foundations and financial institutions that seeks
to "improve the economic well-being of low-income people." Who We Are, LIVING
CITIES, https://www.livingcities.org/about (last visited May 4, 2017).
201. A private foundation includes all 501(c)(3) organizations other than:
(1) organizations to which contributions qualify for the 50% charitable contribution
deduction allowed by Code section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) and (viii)
of that section); (2) organizations that are broadly supported by the public; (3)
supporting organizations performing the functions of related charities; and (4)




1. Net Investment Income
Private foundations are not entirely exempt from taxation. Section
4940 of the Code generally imposes an annual excise tax equal to two percent
of a private foundation's net investment income for the taxable year.2 02 Net
investment income includes both (1) income from interest, dividends, rents,
payments with respect to securities loans, royalties, and similar sources, to the
extent that the income exceeds any expenses paid or incurred in earning it; and
(2) capital gain net income from the sale or other disposition of property held
by the private foundation.203 Therefore, regardless of whether the investment
in a SIB is classified as a loan generating interest income, an equity investment
generating dividends, or a payment with respect to a prepaid forward contract,
the income generated by a SIB investment will likely be subject to this excise
tax. 2 04 Moreover, if the SIB-funded program is unsuccessful and the private
foundation loses its entire investment, then this transaction may potentially be
treated as a loss from the sale or other disposition of property, in which case
capital losses will only be allowed to the extent of gains from such sales or
other dispositions.205
2. Jeopardizing Investments
Because SIB-funded programs potentially generate both a social and
financial return, philanthropic foundations that invest in SIBs may face
additional tax consequences. 206 In particular, these investors-and under
202. I.R.C. § 4940(a). However, this excise tax does not apply to private
foundations that qualify as an "exempt operating foundation," as that term is defined
in Code section 4940(d)(2), for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 4940(d)(l)-(2). Moreover,
the excise tax is reduced to one percent where the private foundation meets certain
distribution requirements. I.R.C. § 4940(e).
203. I.R.C. § 4940(c); see also Reg. § 53.4940-1(f). Any income that is
subject to the UBIT imposed by Code section 511 is not subject to this excise tax.
I.R.C. § 4940.
204. However, capital gains and losses from the sale or disposition of
program-related investments, as defined in Code section 4944(c) and discussed below,
are not taken into account. Reg. § 53.4940-1(f).
205. I.R.C. § 4940(c)(4)(C). No capital loss carryovers or carrybacks are
allowed. I.R.C. § 4940(c)(4)(C).
206. In addition to the nondistribution constraint and other requirements,
private foundations are subject to additional restrictions that are not imposed on public
charities. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang,
Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking
in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 24 (2011). Pension
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certain circumstances, their managers-may be subject to a two-tier excise tax
regime if they make risky investments.2 07 The Code provides that an excise
tax will apply to a private foundation that makes investments that jeopardize
the carrying out of the private foundation's exempt purposes.208 An investment
is considered a jeopardizing investment if the foundation managers failed to
exercise ordinary business care and prudence in making the investment to
provide for the financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt
purpose.20 9 This determination requires a facts and circumstances analysis by
the foundation managers, which may take into account the expected return, the
risks of rising and falling price levels, and the need for diversification within
the investment portfolio.210
An investment in a SIB may be considered a jeopardizing investment,
thereby subjecting the foundation to this excise tax. SIBs are often structured
so that philanthropic foundations that invest in the SIB-funded program
funds also face similar concerns about investing in ventures that produce social as well
as financial returns because of the U.S. Department of Labor's view that sections 403
and 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) do not permit
fiduciaries to promote collateral goals at the expense of the economic interests of plan
participants. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015). However, the Department of
Labor recently clarified that pension plan fiduciaries may consider economic,
environmental, social, and governance concerns in addition to a financial return when
making investments. News Release, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., New Guidance on
Economically Targeted Invsestments in Retirement Plans from US Labor Department
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsalebsa20152045.htm; see
also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015); RICHARD L. Fox, TAXATION OF CHARITABLE
GIVING AND EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § B 1.01 (2d ed. 2009).
207. See I.R.C. § 4944; Fox, supra note 206, § B1.01.
208. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). The amount of the excise tax imposed on the
foundation is ten percent of the amount of the jeopardizing investment made that year.
I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). In addition, the investment is subject to an additional tax, payable
by the foundation, equal to 25% of the investment amount if the investment is not
removed from jeopardy within the taxable period. I.R.C. § 4944(b)(1). If the excise
tax is imposed on the foundation, a foundation manager may also be subject to an
additional excise tax of ten percent of the invested amount, up to a maximum tax of
$10,000, if the foundation manager knowingly (but not willfully or due to reasonable
cause) made the investment in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any
of the foundation's exempt purposes. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2), (d)(2). A foundation
manager subject to the excise tax may also be subject to an additional tax of five
percent of the amount of the investment, up to a maximum tax of $20,000, if such
manager refuses to remove the investment from jeopardy. I.R.C. § 4944(b)(2), (d)(2).
209. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i).
210. Id. However, once an investment is determined not to constitute a
jeopardizing investment, the investment will not later be considered a jeopardizing
investment even if the investment later results in a loss to the foundation. Id.
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receive a lower rate of return than private investors. Consider for instance the
Junior Lenders in the Massachusetts SIB. The Junior Lenders are private
foundations that make an investment in the SIB that is both riskier and less
profitable than the Senior Lender's investment. Moreover, these investors
stand to lose their entire investment if the program is unsuccessful. Thus, given
the disproportionate risk to return ratio, it is possible that an investment in a
SIB-funded program may constitute a high-risk, speculative investment that
does not satisfy the requisite standard of care and prudence. If this is the case,
then investing in a SIB-funded program may subject a foundation's investment
to the jeopardy investment excise tax.
One way that a private foundation can avoid this excise tax on
jeopardizing investments is by demonstrating that the foundation managers
exercised ordinary business care and prudence and made an investment that
furthers the foundation's charitable purpose. In light of the recent guidance
issued by the Service, which effectively expanded the opportunities for
mission-related investments by private foundations, investments by private
foundations in SIBs can most likely satisfy this requirement. 21 1 in Notice
2015-62, the Service clarified that in determining whether an investment is
prudent, foundation managers may consider the relationship of the proposed
investment to the foundation's charitable purpose.212 Accordingly, foundation
managers may make an investment at an expected rate of return that is less
than what the foundation might obtain from an investment that is unrelated to
its charitable purpose.213 Pursuant to this guidance, the foundation managers
of the Junior Lenders in the Massachusetts SIB will likely be considered to
have acted with ordinary business care and prudence in making the SIB
investment even though the anticipated investment returns are less than what
otherwise could be earned on market investments. This is because the goal of
the Massachusetts SIB-financed project to provide relief to underprivileged
individuals and promote social welfare by addressing juvenile delinquency is
consistent with the charitable purposes shared by the Junior Lenders.2 14 Thus,
the investment in the Massachusetts SIB will likely qualify as a mission-
211. See Notice 2015-62, 2015-39 I.R.B. 411.
212. Id. The guidance also clarified that the list of facts and circumstances
that foundation managers must consider in making the investment is not exhaustive.
Id. As a result of this Notice, the prudent-investor standard for jeopardy investments
is now better aligned with the state standards applicable to charitable investments
under the Uniform Prudent Management Institutional Funds Act. See Fox, supra note
206, at § 1.01.
213. See Notice 2015-62, 2015-39 I.R.B. 411.
214. See Mass. Contract, supra note 13, at app. H. In fact, the intermediary,
Third Sector Capital Partners, the service provider, and the grantors also share these
same charitable purposes. See id.
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related investment that is not subject to the excise tax on jeopardizing
investments.
Alternatively, a private foundation can also avoid the excise tax on
jeopardizing investments if the investment is considered a "program-related
investment."2 15 To qualify as a program-related investment, a debt, equity,
recoverable grant, or other type of investment made by a private foundation
must meet three requirements: (1) the foundation must be motivated primarily
by a desire to accomplish its exempt charitable purpose, (2) the production of
income or the appreciation of property may not be a significant factor behind
the foundation's investment, and (3) only limited lobbying purposes and no
electioneering may be served by the investments.2 16 If a private foundation
that invests in a SIB-funded program meets these three criteria, it can
potentially escape the excise tax regardless of whether or not it meets the
"prudent man" rule described above.
Unfortunately, given the limited Service guidance on acceptable
program-related investments, it is unclear whether an investment in a SIB-
funded program will satisfy these criteria.2 17 In particular, a potential issue
arises with respect to whether the investment meets the second requirement:
that the production of income is not a significant factor behind the foundation's
investment. In determining whether the production of income is a significant
factor, a relevant consideration is "whether investors solely engaged in the
investment for profit would be likely to make the investment on the same terms
as the private foundation."2 18 On the one hand, the production of income is
arguably not a significant factor behind the foundation's investment in SIB
arrangements structured as a tranche investment, such as the Massachusetts
SIB. Because the private foundation's investment receives a lower rate of
return and is subordinate to the Senior Lenders' investment, this suggests that
an investor whose sole motivation is the production of income would likely
not make the investment on the same terms as the private foundation. 2 19 Even
if the SIB-funded program is successful and the private foundation realizes a
profit, this does not change this result in the absence of other factors, especially
215. I.R.C. § 4944(c); Reg. § 53.4944-3.
216. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a).
217. See Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii); see also Murray & Hwang, supra note
206, at 26.
218. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii).
219. For example, the Treasury has noted that a private foundation does not
have a significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of
property when it provides a loan to a business to be used in a manner to further the
accomplishment of its exempt activities and the loan bears interest at a rate less than
that charged by financial institutions that have agreed to lend funds to the business,.
Reg. § 53.4944-3(b), Ex. 6.
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given the fact that all SIBs today have a capped maximum return.2 20 The Junior
Lenders in the Massachusetts SIB appear to take the position that their SIB
investment qualifies as a program-related investment.22 1
Furthermore, even if a private foundation invests on the same terms
as a private investor, it is possible that the investment constitutes a program-
related investment. To qualify as a program-related investment, the investment
generally must have an expected rate of return that is below- market on a risk-
adjusted basis.2 22 SIBs that have currently launched in the United States are
expected to yield a return that is substantially lower than a similar investment
due to the risky nature of the preventative programs employed by the nonprofit
service providers. Investors appear willing to accept the risks and expected
lower returns for nonfinancial reasons, such as charitable agendas or improved
public relations.22 3 Investors who were solely motivated by financial gains
would likely not invest in these SIBs. Thus, the Service may conclude that the
production of income was not a significant factor in making the investment in
the SIB. 224 However, this reasoning may no longer apply once SIBs gain
greater acceptance and are able to offer a higher rate of return.
220. See Reg. § 53.4944-3 (noting that the fact that an investment produces
significant income or capital appreciation is not conclusive evidence that this was a
significant purpose of the foundation in entering into the investment); see also P.L.R.
2006-10-020 (Dec. 13, 2005) (stating that the Service has determined that proposed
investments that place a cap on the maximum investment return, among other features,
constitute program related investments).
221. See MASS. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
222. See FRANCIE BRODY ET AL., CURRENT PRACTICES IN PROGRAM-
RELATED INVESTING (2002), http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-
wealth.org/files/downloads/article-brody-mcqueen.pdf. This rate of return is generally
from one and four percent. See id. at 2.
223. See BARAJAS ET AL., supra note 14, at 13; JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL
To ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
(2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/
socialimpact bonds.pdf.
224. See, e.g., P.L.R. 2006-10-020 (Dec. 13, 2005) (concluding that a private
foundation's investment in a limited liability company on the same terms as the other
members, none of which is investing solely for profit, and which is expected to yield
a substantially lower return than a typical angel investment due to the requirement that
the entity invest in low-income communities that have been unable to obtain
conventional financing, satisfies the requirement that no significant purpose of the
investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property).
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3. Failure to Distribute Income
A private foundation is also subject to a separate excise tax on its
undistributed income.225 A foundation can generally avoid this tax by making
qualifying distributions that are at least five percent of the net value of its
investment assets. 226 Qualifying distributions include amounts paid to
accomplish its exempt charitable purposes, amounts paid to acquire assets held
for use in exempt activities, program-related investments, and certain set-
asides for future expenditures in particular charitable projects.227 Therefore, if
the SIB investment qualified as a program-related investment, the private
foundation investors would not only avoid the excise tax on jeopardizing
investments but would also be able to treat the investment as a qualifying
distribution for purposes of meeting the private foundation's five percent
annual minimum distribution requirement.
4. Excess Business Holdings
Finally, a private foundation is also subject to tax on the excess
business holdings that it has in a business enterprise.22 8 A business enterprise
excludes: (1) a business that is substantially related to the foundation's exempt
purposes, (2) a business that is functionally related to its exempt activities, (3)
a program-related investment, or (4) a business that derives at least 95% of its
gross income from passive activities. 229 Therefore, if the SIB investment
constitutes a program-related investment, then the investment will not trigger
this tax.
Even if the SIB investment does not qualify as a program-related
investment, the tax on excess business holdings may not apply under certain
circumstances. For instance, if the SIB investment is characterized as debt,
then this tax is not applicable because a debt obligation is not an interest in a
business enterprise.20 Moove, even if the interest were recharacterized as
an equity interest in a corporation orjoint venture, then the tax would not apply
if the business were substantially related to the foundation's exempt purpose
or if the foundation's equitable interest exceeded 20% of the corporation's
225. I.R.C. § 4942(a). However, operating foundations are exempt from
these taxes. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, ¶ 101.5.
226. I.R.C. § 4942; see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, T 101.5.
227. I.R.C. § 4942(g); Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(1); see also BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 124, T 101.5.
228. I.R.C. § 4943(a).
229. I.R.C. § 4943(d)(3); Reg. §§ 53.4943-1 & -10(b), (c); see also
BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 124, T 101.6.
230. Reg. § 53.4943-10(a)(2).
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voting stock or the partnership's profits interest. This is essentially the same
definition that is used to determine if the foundation has unrelated business
taxable income.23 1 As discussed above, currently launched SIBs, such as the
Massachusetts SIB, most likely do not generate unrelated business taxable
income and, therefore, a SIB investment most likely does not constitute a
business holding in a business enterprise.232
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the above analysis demonstrates, investors in a SIB face substantial
tax uncertainty. Currently, no direct guidance exists as to how to characterize
SIB arrangements for tax purposes. Instead, current law potentially allows
investors to characterize the SIB arrangement as debt, corporate or partnership
equity, or a prepaid swap arrangement, which may result in similarly situated
taxpayers being taxed differently. This uncertainty also increases audit risk for
private investors, as the Service and taxpayer may disagree as to the correct
characterization of a SIB. Similarly, nonprofit investors face uncertainty as to
whether investing in a SIB exposes them to additional taxes or, possibly, even
causes them to lose their tax-exempt status.
This Part seeks to determine the most likely tax implications of
investing in a SIB. Specifically, this Part argues that SIBs should generally be
classified as contingent debt under current tax law but that it may be
appropriate to bifurcate the transaction in the case of nonprofit investors.
However, as discussed above, these conclusions are not entirely free from
doubt. Thus, to encourage SIB investments and ensure the appropriate
collection of tax revenue, this Part concludes that the Service should issue
guidance that clarifies the tax treatment of SIBs and recommends ways to
structure the SIB arrangement to minimize some of the negative tax
implications that a SIB investment potentially raises until such guidance is
issued.
A. Contingent Debt Treatment
Despite the different potential alternatives, this Article argues that the
current law weighs in favor of treating a SIB arrangement that is structured
like the Massachusetts SIB as a contingent debt instrument for several reasons.
First, the parties' intentions and the form of the instrument initially points
toward debt characterization. As discussed above, the parties refer to the
investment as a "loan" from the investors to the project intermediary, the
231. See BITTKER & LoKKEN, supra note 124, ¶ 101.6.
232. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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investors are referred to as "lenders," the agreement provides for a stated rate
of interest, and repayment is generally unsubordinated. These factors weigh in
favor of a debt characterization instead of an equity or derivative instrument
characterization. The intermediary may also issue a note or other instrument
of indebtedness, which would further support the parties' contention that the
SIB arrangement creates a debt instrument.
Second, labeling the instrument as debt binds the issuer and all holders
of the instrument to this characterization.233 Thus, under these circumstances,
the SIB arrangement will likely be recharacterized as something other than
debt only if the Service decides to challenge the characterization of the
instrument. 234 Practically speaking, however, the Service is unlikely to
challenge the debt characterization in most instances because it generally
results in unfavorable tax consequences to the private investors from a timing
and tax rate perspective. In particular, because the payment of interest and
principal is contingent on the success of the SIB, characterizing the instrument
as debt means the SIB arrangement constitutes a contingent debt instrument
subject to the contingent debt rules. As a result, the SIB investors have to
account for any potential return on investment on an annual basis and
characterize any return as ordinary income.
Third, the fact that a SIB arrangement does not provide an
unconditional promise to pay the principal at a fixed maturity date but is
instead contingent on the success of a particular social program does not
necessarily preclude debt characterization. For the contingent debt rules to
apply, the Treasury Regulations require that the instrument constitute "debt"
for tax purposes.235 Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations define
"debt" for these purposes. 236 However, the Service's ten-year effort to
construct a tax regime for contingent debt instruments suggests that the
Service believes that some instruments that are contingent as to principal and
interest can constitute debt instruments.237
In addition, some authorities suggest that an instrument may be
characterized as debt if the investor reasonably expects the return of his
233. See I.R.C. § 385(c).
234. See id.; Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972);
I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357. Such label will be respected unless a sufficient
basis exists for disregarding the form of the transaction into which the parties cast their
dealings. See Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 730 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1984);
Piedmont Corp. v. Comm'r, 388 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1968).
235. See Reg. § 1.1275-4.
236. See id.; ANDREA S. KRAMER, FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: TAXATION,
REGULATION, AND DESIGN § 50.07[A] (3d ed. 2008).
237. See Levy, supra note 130, at 500.
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investment.23 8 In the case of the Massachusetts SIB, the service provider
implemented an evidence-based, high-impact intervention during the 25 years
prior to the launching of the SIB. 239 The program also has a proven track
record of reducing incarceration rates among the highest-risk individuals.240
Thus, the investors may reasonably expect a return of their investment.
Similarly, a SIB arrangement may also be structured so that the investors
receive greater protections from downside risks. For instance, several SIBs
that have been launched provide for a guarantee that ensures that the investors
are repaid a certain amount of their investment. 241 Similarly, a SIB
arrangement may provide for collateral in an adequately valued asset, an
interest in reserve funds, first-loss provisions, and other credit-enhancing
methods. These types of provisions increase the investor's reasonable
expectation of repayment and insulate the investor from some of the risks
associated with the SIB structure. In these cases, the contingent nature of the
instrument is even less problematic.
Finally, the totality of the factors does not support a finding that the
SIB investor has an ownership interest in the business of providing or
managing social services or in any other business or going concern. Instead,
the burdens and benefits of this business remain with the government, the
social service provider, and the project intermediary. For instance, pursuant to
the Massachusetts SIB project documents, the service provider receives
payments for providing the specified social services and receives additional
compensation if it exceeds certain performance thresholds. Similarly, the
project intermediary is paid a service fee for the services that it provides as a
fiscal agent and project manager. The SIB investors are not entitled to a portion
of any of these fees and do not participate in any benefits or burdens related to
these businesses. Thus, although equity characterization is possible under
some circumstances, a SIB that is structured like the Massachusetts SIB has
too many equity-like features that are missing and should be characterized as
debt rather than equity.
238. See Farber, supra note 55, at 665. However, there remains a lot of
uncertainty regarding whether the existence of an economic likelihood of repayment
is sufficient to support a debt characterization of an instrument when the specific terms
of the instrument do not provide an unconditional right to a sum certain. See id.
239. See MAss. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
240. See id.
241. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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B. Bifurcation for Nonprofit Investors
This article also argues that in a SIB structured as a tranche investment
like the Massachusetts SIB, the SIB investment should be bifurcated into two
transactions with respect to the Junior Lenders. Specifically, the investment
should be bifurcated as follows: (1) the issuance of a financial instrument that
bears a market rate of return, and (2) the issuance of a financial instrument that
is not entitled to any return. The first transaction should be treated as
contingent debt for the same reasons discussed above with respect to the
private investors. The second transaction should be treated as a charitable
contribution of the foregone interest. Together, these two transactions are
economically equivalent to a subordinated investment that bears a below-
market rate of return in a SIB with a tranche investment structure. This
characterization should be permitted for several reasons.
First, the subordinated investment made by the Junior Lenders is most
likely charitable in nature. Consider for instance the Massachusetts SIB. As
discussed above, these investors are philanthropic foundations, which transfer
funds in the form of subordinated loans. These loans bear a lower rate of return
on their investment as compared to the Senior Lender even though the Junior
Lenders take on greater risk.242 This is contrary to a typical market transaction
where more risky investments are awarded with a higher potential rate of
return. Instead, the Junior Lenders' willingness to accept this below-market
financial return likely stems from their interest in maximizing social impact,
rather than profit.243 This is especially likely given the fact that the Junior
Lenders are private foundations; their mission aligns with that of the SIB-
financed program and the risk-absorbing nature of their investment.
Second, even though the case law currently disfavors bifurcating a
financial instrument into separate components, at least one case stands for the
proposition that a single instrument with both equity-like and debt-like
features can be bifurcated into two instruments. 244 Moreover, given the
charitable component of the Junior Lenders' investment, this is not purely a
financial instrument, and bifurcation of a transaction into its separate
components has been permitted in other contexts under current law. Thus, this
may be another situation where bifurcation is permissible. Even if the current
242. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
243. See MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 82, at 39.
244. See Farber, supra note 55, at 659 (citing to Farley Realty Corp. v.
Comm'r, 279 F.2d 701, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1960), which addresses a case where
bifurcation was permitted for an instrument with both equity-like and debt-like
features); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 13.
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law does not support this treatment, the Junior Lenders can accomplish this
result with some advanced planning, as further discussed below.
Third, bifurcation of the transaction is preferable to the alternative of
either (1) trying to fit this novel investment into an existing, imperfectly fitting
characterization or (2) enacting legislation that creates a new characterization
for SIB investments. Although the contingent debt characterization is the most
accurate way to characterize SIB investments for the reasons discussed above,
this characterization does not accurately reflect the economic substance of the
SIB arrangement with respect to the Junior Lenders when a tranche investment
structure is used. Specifically, it fails to take into account that a rational, profit-
motivated investor would not accept a subordinated loan that bears a lower
rate of interest than the senior loan. Instead, there is a charitable purpose
motivating this transaction. In addition, treating this transaction solely as
contingent debt would potentially result in economically similar instruments
being taxed differently because, as discussed further below, investors can
formally bifurcate the transaction with advance planning and achieve this
result. Enacting legislation that creates a new characterization for SIB
investments may also inadvertently treat economically similar instruments
differently and create distortionary results.2 45 It may also be difficult to create
a new characterization that accurately captures the economic substance of the
SIB arrangement given the fact that all SIB arrangements are not identical.
Moreover, as with many financial instruments, any specific characterization
contemplated for the SIB arrangement would quickly become outdated as the
SIB structure continues to evolve. 246 Therefore, applying a component
analysis would most accurately characterize these instruments from an
economic perspective especially in comparison to the available alternatives.2 47
C Planning Recommendations
Until the current tax law governing financial instruments is changed
or direct guidance is issued by Congress or the Treasury, the uncertainty
surrounding the tax implications of SIB investments will remain. This Section
suggests ways to structure the SIB arrangement in the meantime to minimize
the negative effects of this uncertainty.
Many of the unfavorable tax consequences that private investors in a
SIB potentially face are most likely to arise if the SIB investment is
245. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 13; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane
M. Ring, The New "Human Equity " Transactions, 5 CAL. L. REv. CIR. 266 (2014).
246. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 127, at 13.
247. See Farber, supra note 55, at 683 (reaching a similar conclusion with
respect to other financial instruments that are neither debt nor equity).
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characterized as contingent debt or as a prepaid swap arrangement. This is
because both the noncontingent bond method and the noncontingent swap
method would accelerate the investors' recognition of income and subject that
income to ordinary tax rates. An investor may be able to mitigate these
negative tax implications under some circumstances if the SIB arrangement is
formally structured as a cash-settled prepaid forward contract instead. Because
both a contingent debt instrument and a prepaid swap are equivalent to a cash-
settled prepaid forward contract in both form and substance, this would not
change the economics of the transaction.2 48 In both cases, the purchasers of the
debt instrument receive the same legal rights that they would have received if
they had purchased a cash-settled prepaid forward contract on the projected
value of the government savings resulting from a successful social program.2 4 9
In other words, in both cases, the purchaser is entitled to receive a right to a
payment in the future only if a specific social program is successful. Thus, the
parties can achieve this structure merely by altering the label of the investment.
If the Service does not challenge this characterization, then the parties may be
able to benefit from a deferral of any income recognition until the termination
of the SIB arrangement as well as capital gain treatment.
Even if this characterization is challenged, under some circumstances
the prepaid forward contract characterization may be respected as the correct
characterization of the SIB arrangement. In particular, in situations where the
SIB arrangement is not merely paying to scale a social program that has
already proven to be effective but instead is financing a new and untested
method, the prepaid forward contract characterization may better reflect the
economics of the arrangement. 25 0 In these cases, the expected likelihood of
248. See supra notes 123-139 and accompanying text. See also Levy, supra
note 130, at 522.
249. See Levy, supra note 130, at 522 (concluding that a gold note and a
cash-settled prepaid forward contract on gold are practically identical because in both
cases the purchaser only receives creditor's rights against its respective counterparty).
250. One of the purported benefits of the SIB arrangement is that it
encourages innovation in the public sector. See GOODALL, supra note 12, at 7; KoHLI
ET AL., supra note 3; Liang et al., supra note 125, at 272. Specifically, by having
private investors, rather than the government, provide the upfront investment capital,
the government effectively shifts the performance and financial risks of funding
certain social service activities to the private sector. See Davies, supra note 2, at 5;
Liang et al., supra note 125, at 274; N.Y. FACT SHEET, supra note 14. Given that
private investors generally have a higher risk tolerance than government agencies, this
shift encourages the pursuit of new and creative methods to solve complex social
problems. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3; GOODALL, supra note 12, at 7; Esha
Chhabra, Social Impact Bonds: The "It Girl" of Muni Finance, NEXTCITY (Jun. 23,
2014), https://nextcity.org/features/view/social-impact-bonds-public-private-solution
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repayment significantly decreases and the transaction becomes much more
speculative. Thus, it is more appropriate to treat the transaction as an open
transaction and wait until the event occurs before imposing taxes on the
investor.
With respect to nonprofit investors, SIB arrangements should be
structured in a manner that minimizes the risk of (1) jeopardizing the nonprofit
entity's tax-exempt status and (2) incurring any additional taxes. This is
particularly important in SIBs that are structured as tranche investments like
the Massachusetts SIB. As discussed above, these investments run the risk of
losing their tax-exempt status as a result of violating the private inurement
doctrine and the private benefit doctrine. To minimize this risk, the parties
need to ensure that the private senior lenders are not related to the nonprofit
Junior Lenders or to any nonprofit grantors. This would prevent the Junior
Lenders and any grantors from running afoul of the private inurement doctrine.
However, this would not minimize the risk of violating the private
benefit doctrine. This doctrine is more ambiguous and does not have any
"insider" requirement. As a result, it is more difficult to manage this risk.
Without a change in the law to confine the scope of the private benefit
doctrine, this doctrine has the potential to substantially limit the feasibility of
tranche investment strategies as well as many other beneficial investments.
Thus, as numerous commentators have already recognized, the private benefit
doctrine is in need of reform.251
To further minimize the risk of any additional taxes, a private
foundation in a SIB with a tranche investment structure should also consider
structuring its investment in a manner that ensures it is treated as a bifurcated
transaction for tax purposes. For instance, instead of making a subordinated
loan to the project intermediary that bears a subsidizing, low rate of return, the
foundation can make two separate investments. One investment would take
the form of a loan that bears a market rate of interest. The second investment
would take the form of a recoverable grant, which would provide for
repayment of the investor's funds only if the project is successful. Together
-social-problems-cities ("[I]nvestor dollars provided through SIBs don't have the
limitations of project grants or government dollars; they offer a new freedom.").
251. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 106, at 47 (noting that the private benefit
doctrine has "the potential to severely restrict the workability of tranched investment
strategies" and recommending that the private benefit doctrine should be narrowed to
apply only in certain clearly defined situations that (1) do not include any subsidizing
investments by market-tranche investors, and (2) do not require a nonprofit that invests
in a social enterprise that "constitute[s] a relatively small share of a charity's total
operational budget . .. [to] maintain ongoing formal control over the organization");
see also Dagher, supra note 9, at 3514-18.
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these two investments would be economically equivalent to a subordinated
SIB investment that carries a below-market rate of interest.
By bifurcating the investment, the investor would further minimize
any possibility that the excise tax on jeopardizing investments would apply to
its SIB investment. With respect to the first investment, the investment should
easily satisfy the "prudent man" standard because the investment bears a
market or near-market rate of interest. Thus, the foundation managers would
likely be able to demonstrate that they exercised ordinary business care and
prudence in making an investment to provide for the financial needs of the
foundation to carry out its exempt purpose.
Moreover, the second investment, the recoverable grant, would likely
be respected as a program-related investment and, therefore, not be subject to
the excise tax on jeopardizing investments. Specifically, an investor that
makes a recoverable grant that bears no rate of return to support a SIB-
financed program is more likely concerned with social impact over financial
benefits. Thus, it provides taxpayers with more certainty that the production
of income is not a significant factor behind the foundation's investment. So as
long as the investment in the SIB-financed program is consistent with its
exempt charitable purpose and no lobbying or electioneering purposes are
served by the investments, this portion of the SIB investment should qualify
as a program-related investment. Qualifying as a program-related investment
would also provide additional benefits to a private foundation that invests in a
SIB. For instance, the investment would be treated as a qualifying investment
for purposes of meeting the private foundation's five percent annual minimum
distribution requirement, which would help the foundation avoid the excise
tax on undistributed income. The investment would also escape the tax on
excess business holdings.
CONCLUSION
SIBs have the potential to provide an additional source of capital to
finance critical social services. However, the current law creates substantial
tax uncertainty for potential SIB investors. With respect to private investors,
this uncertainty primarily arises because a SIB arrangement does not clearly
constitute debt or equity but instead is a hybrid instrument that contains debt,
equity, and charitable features. With respect to nonprofit investors, the
uncertainty stems from the potentially broad application of the private benefit
doctrine, as well as the limited guidance defining acceptable program-related
investments.
In applying the current law to these instruments, this Article argues
that it is generally most appropriate to treat a SIB as a contingent debt
instrument for tax purposes. In addition, under certain circumstances, it may
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be appropriate to treat a nonprofit entity's investment partially as an interest
in a financial instrument and partially as a charitable contribution. Moreover,
with advance planning, potential investors can limit the extent of the
uncertainty surrounding a SIB investment. Nevertheless, this Article
concludes that if SIBs become more prevalent and continue to evolve, they are
likely to continue to challenge our tax system. Accordingly, unless guidance
is issued and changes to the law are made, the current taxation of SIBs may
deter private and philanthropic investors from seeking out SIB investments,
thereby creating a significant hurdle to the development of SIB-funded
programs in the United States.25 2
252. For a discussion of some ways the current tax law may be modified to
extend favorable tax treatment to SIBs, see Mazur, supra note 8.
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